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I. INTRODUCTION 
The implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA)1 highlights inequalities between those with employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESI) and those without, even as many 
without ESI gain new access to affordable insurance.  The tax penalties 
enacted to prevent workers with ESI from entering the individual 
exchanges for health insurance are a missed opportunity to help eliminate 
the irrational attachment many with ESI feel towards their health 
insurance. 
I disagree with the tax subsidies that protect ESI and how the Obama 
administration has succumbed to irrational fears over the potential 
breakdown of ESI through both rhetoric and recent administrative 
guidance.  The media and scholars remain focused on whether employers 
will unceremoniously “dump”2 employees into the health insurance 
exchanges, and the Obama administration has responded with assurances 
and tweaks proving that the ACA is simply another layer added on to our 
existing system of health insurance and not a threat to our attachment to 
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 1.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.) (jointly ACA). 
 2.  The word “dump” is clearly inflammatory, but I use it here at times not only because its use 
is prevalent in scholarship and media coverage of the issue but also because it demonstrates the 
emotions and fears involved in the debate over whether individuals will lose their ESI.  But cf. David 
A. Hyman, Response, PPACA in Theory and Practice: The Perils of Parallelism, 97 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 83, 100–01 (2011) (taking issue with the use of the “loaded word” dumping in this academic 
debate particularly because health law and policy scholars associate it with the maligned practice of 
hospitals transferring uninsured patients to a separate emergency room department—a practice that 
resulted in Congress passing the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act). 
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ESI.3  As long as this attachment remains intact, however, those 
purchasing health insurance in the exchanges will be worse off.  My 
solution is a more porous border between the exchanges and employer-
sponsored group health plans to breed familiarity and prevent 
socioeconomic segmentation of the insurance market. 
Protection of ESI under the ACA began with the employer mandate 
to provide acceptable health coverage to employees4 or face tax 
penalties.5  The penalties, when coupled with the tax subsidies that make 
it cheaper for employers to purchase health insurance for employees than 
it would be for those employees to purchase insurance on their own, will 
help incentivize employers to continue providing ESI—and prevent those 
individuals from entering the exchanges without forfeiting valuable tax 
subsidies gained by purchasing health insurance through an employer. 
Even with these added tax penalties and the valuable tax incentives 
that have sustained ESI for decades, some employers were still frustrated 
by increasing costs and employee discontent (particularly among less 
highly compensated workers who struggle to pay for more generous 
health benefits at this point).6  These employers looked to get out of the 
                                                          
 3.  Of course the additional concern of maintaining ESI to avoid increasing the projected 
budget for the ACA cannot be denied, but any budget calculations for the ACA should factor in the 
level of tax revenue foregone through tax exclusions provided to both the employer and employee 
for ESI premiums and co-insurance.  I put the question of how my proposals here would affect the 
ACA budget aside for now to focus on the ongoing preservation of ESI from a social utility 
perspective. 
 4.  See infra Part III.A (discussing what the ACA requires of large employers to avoid tax 
penalties).  It must be noted here that employer-sponsored group health plans do not need to provide 
the essential health benefits that policies sold on the exchanges need to cover.  Hyman, supra note 2, 
at 94 (“Self-insured employers had the political power to get an exemption from the essential health 
benefits requirements when PPACA was enacted.”). 
 5.  See infra Part III.A (discussing the tax penalties assessed to employers that do not offer a 
group health plan as specified under the ACA to employees).  Implementation of the employer 
mandate that is enforced through these penalties had been postponed until 2015.  Valerie Jarrett, 
We’re Listening to Business About the Health Care Law, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 2, 2013, 6:00 
PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/02/we-re-listening-businesses-about-health-care-law 
(“[W]e believe we need to give employers more time to comply with the new rules.”). 
 6.  Whether lower-income workers with ESI understand it or not, however, their health 
insurance costs are subsidized by more highly compensated workers because of ERISA’s 
nondiscrimination provisions.  See Christopher T. Robertson, Scaling Cost-Sharing to Wages: How 
Employers Can Reduce Health Spending and Provide Greater Economic Security, 14 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 239, 293–94 (2014) (theorizing that there is a wage floor for low-income 
workers that requires highly compensated workers to use part of their tax subsidies to persuade the 
low-income to participate in an employer’s group health plan as required by ERISA’s 
nondiscrimination rules).  The benefits to this socioeconomic class are offset by their 
disproportionate underrepresentation among those with ESI compared to their percentage of the 
population, however.  See JOHN HOLAHAN & VICKI CHEN, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, DECLINING 
HEALTH INSURANCE IN LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES AND SMALL BUSINESSES (2012), 
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health insurance business and viewed the ACA as a golden opportunity.  
Parallels to the historical development of private pensions abound.  
When the Social Security Act passed, employers were able to transfer 
responsibility for providing pensions to low-income workers to the 
government by integrating Social Security with their pension plans.7  
Employees were all guaranteed a baseline income in retirement, and 
employers could focus on using pensions to reward and retain the highly 
compensated, making private pensions a human resources tool instead of 
a social safety net for low-income workers.8  A similar path with ESI is 
predictable in the absence of government interference. 
But knowing how attached most Americans with ESI are to their 
insurance, the media devoted great attention to the possibility that 
employers might shift all or some employees into the exchanges.9  Even 
with the employer mandate, some employers will make the rational 
calculation to pay the tax penalty and terminate their group health 
plans.10  This would force employees into individual markets if they want 
to purchase insurance and break the promise President Obama repeatedly 
made that employees would be able to keep their health insurance and 
medical providers.  Although this would not be a happy turn of events for 
President Obama’s popularity given the promises made that the ACA 
was not an attack on ESI, assuming employers are rational actors, the 
risk of adding to the budget of the ACA and the burden on the exchanges 
to cover additional individuals is estimable and limited.  If an employer 
pushes all employees—both healthy and sick, low-risk and high-risk for 
insurers—onto exchanges, then the risk pool will remain roughly the 
same and the insurance plans offered mainly to those without ESI will be 
relatively affordable.  The healthy will subsidize the cost of insurance for 
the sick, as they do now under ESI, and there will be little to no adverse 




 7.  See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the parallels between Social Security integration and the 
incentives under the ACA to selectively “dump” low-income workers into the exchanges). 
 8.  See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY 28–29 (2005) (“The public pension program provided a ‘floor of protection’ 
that was too low to sustain a high earner’s standard of living . . . . Perhaps because they wished to 
defuse business opposition, proponents of OASI seconded the view that public and private pensions 
played complementary roles.”). 
 9.  See infra notes 21–22. 
 10.  See Thomas Buchmueller, Colleen Carey & Helen G. Levy, Will Employers Drop Health 
Insurance Coverage Because Of The Affordable Care Act?, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1522, 1528 (2013) 
(“Microsimulation models built on sound economic principles have for the most part predicted 
relatively small declines in employer-sponsored coverage as a result of health reform, and we 
believe that these predictions are likely to be correct.”). 
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selection.11  Excluding the value of tax subsidies lost by purchasing 
insurance on the exchanges instead of through employers, and assuming 
any forfeited employer subsidies are replaced by higher wages, 
individuals should be indifferent about where they purchase their plans.12 
Yet the Obama administration immediately took action to safeguard 
ESI with additional tax penalties preventing employers from moving 
employees into the exchanges.  The administration was likely concerned 
not just with the budget for the ACA tax credits and an influx of millions 
more onto the young and fragile exchanges before the kinks were worked 
out, but also fearful of breaking promises that ESI would be protected 
and forcing sudden change on those already satisfied with their health 
insurance given the tenuous popularity of the ACA.  The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) issued guidance clarifying, and then reaffirming, 
that employers may not subsidize the purchase of individual policies by 
employees using pre-tax contributions through Health Reimbursement 
Arrangements (HRAs).13  Such action would result in a penalty of $100 
per employee per day, or $36,500 per employee annually, a large penalty 
ensuring that no rational employer will attempt this cost-containment 
strategy.14 
My Article argues that this decision—and tax subsidies for ESI in 
general—harm health reform efforts because we should instead 
encourage employers to subsidize their employees’ purchase of insurance 
in the exchanges.  Only then can we eliminate the irrational 
overvaluation of ESI.  Using the growing literature on bounded 
rationality in behavior that counters the traditional law and economics 
assumption of a rational actor, I assert that this is the perfect area for 
statutory or regulatory action to debias through the law because of the 
competing employee bias in favor of individual accounts in employee 
                                                          
 11.  Adverse selection occurs when high-risk individuals disproportionately enter the pool of 
insureds and increase the costs of insurance. 
 12.  Assuming complete information, employees should be indifferent about where they 
purchase their health insurance including the value of the tax subsidies forgone as well since 
economists believe that employees pay for these subsidies through decreased wages.  See 
Buchmueller, Carey & Levy, supra note 10, at 1523 (“Economists are in near-unanimous agreement 
that workers ultimately pay for health insurance through lower wages . . . The logic is that employers 
care about the cost of total compensation, not how compensation is split between wages and 
benefits; therefore, they will offer insurance only if they can adjust wages to keep total compensation 
constant.”); Craig A. Olson, Do Workers Accept Lower Wages in Exchange for Health Benefits?, 20 
J. LAB. ECON. S91 (2002) (demonstrating, using empirical evidence, that women in the sample 
accepted a 20% decrease in wages to move from a job without health benefits to one with such 
benefits). 
 13.  HRAs are tax-favored individual accounts through which employers reimburse employees 
for medical expenses.  See infra Part IV.A (discussing defined contribution financing in healthcare). 
 14.  See infra Part III.B (discussing the recent IRS guidance). 
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benefits.  While employer preferences show marked rationality in the 
area of employer-sponsored health insurance, employees have an 
attachment to ESI based on familiarity that (1) harms exchange-based 
insurance, and (2) denies employers the ability to use HRAs to subsidize 
the purchase of insurance by their employees on the exchanges.  
Employees have been conditioned to the movement for choice in 
employee benefits through defined contribution plans,15 and this 
background will make it easier to eliminate the overvaluation of ESI. 
Section II of this Article will explain why most Americans with ESI 
overvalue that benefit, including a discussion of the literature on 
bounded rationality.  Fears over the breakdown of ESI and the resulting 
tax barrier separating those with ESI from the exchanges are based on 
cognitive biases, and I explain how all involved would benefit from 
encouraging more people to purchase insurance in the exchanges instead 
of through their employers.  Section III will explore the way that this 
overvaluation of ESI resulted in the public and scholars fretting that 
employers will “dump” employees on the exchanges.  It will also show 
how the Obama administration reacted with new restrictions on the use 
of HRAs.  In Section IV, however, I assert that HRAs are a key first step 
to advance my normative argument that we should subsidize the 
purchase of health insurance on the exchanges instead of through 
employers.  The defined contribution paradigm that took hold over the 
last several decades, especially as applied to health financing, 
conditioned employees to value choice and ownership.  The recent IRS 
guidance contradicts years of government policy favoring the growth of 
individual accounts.  I propose that the restrictions on the use of HRAs to 
subsidize the purchase of health insurance on the exchanges should be 
eliminated. 
II. WHY WE OVERVALUE ESI 
Beginning with the 2008 presidential campaign, President Obama 
helped rally support for his health reform efforts by promising that “if 
you like your coverage you can keep it.”16  In a speech to the American 
Medical Association the following year, he emphasized that “no matter 
                                                          
 15.  “Defined contribution plan” is a phrase originally used in the pension discourse that has 
made its way into the health and welfare benefit context both intentionally and unintentionally 
because of the parallels drawn by scholars between shifts in benefits offered by employers in the two 
areas.  The term “individual accounts,” drawn from IRAs, is typically used interchangeably when 
discussing the defined contribution movement, and I will use both here. 
 16.  See David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Is Health Reform a “Game 
Changer?”, in ILL. L. AND ECON. RES. PAPERS SERIES 11 (Res. Paper No. LE10-010, 2010). 
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how we reform health care, we will keep this promise: If you like your 
doctor, you will be able to keep your doctor.  Period.  If you like your 
health care plan, you will be able to keep your health care plan.  Period.  
No one will take it away.  No matter what.”17 
Although the administration insists that this promise remains true—
for the most part—even if it was a simplification,18 President Obama has 
spent the last several years dealing with outrage from individuals and 
groups losing, or worried about losing, their current health plans.19  
Scholars and the media have also spent the last few years analyzing the 
likelihood that employees will lose coverage based largely on rational 
calculations of whether employers will choose to “pay” penalties under 
the ACA instead of continuing to “play” the game of offering ESI for 
workers.20  When these analyses were largely complete, they turned to 
speculation that employers would find ways under the statute to force or 
incentivize low-income or less healthy employees to instead purchase 
health insurance on the exchanges in spite of nondiscrimination 
protections.21 
                                                          
 17.  Remarks by the President at the Annual Conference of the American Medical Association, 
1 PUB. PAPERS 818 (June 15, 2009). 
 18.  See Colleen McCain Nelson, Peter Nicholas & Carol E. Lee, Aides Debated Obama 
Health-Care Coverage Promise, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2013, at A1. 
 19.  President Obama faced a big challenge in 2013 when insurers began mailing millions of 
cancellation notices to those that already purchase insurance on the individual market because their 
low-premium plans did not meet the minimum standards required by the ACA and they did not 
qualify for “grandfathering.”  Although the administration dubbed these plans “substandard” and 
claimed individuals losing their plans would be enrolled in better, cheaper plans, public outrage rose 
to the point that Democrats (including Bill Clinton) pressured President Obama to step in.  His 
response to allow a temporary reprieve was considered too little too late by many.  See Ashley 
Parker & Robert Pear, In a Reversal, Obama Moves to Avert the Cancellation of Health Policies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at A1; Amy Goldstein & Sean Sullivan, Obama Announces Health-Care 
Fix to Allow Americans to Keep Plans, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2013; Amy Schatz & Janet Hook, Bill 
Clinton Calls for Health-Law Changes to Help People Losing Coverage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 
2013, at A4; Michael D. Shear & Robert Pair, Contrite White House Spurns Health Law’s Critics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at A17; Glenn Kessler, Obama Health-care Vows were Unequivocally 
Wrong, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2013, at A05. 
 20.  A 2011 survey of 1300 employers conducted by McKinsey & Company found that 30% of 
employers “will definitely or probably stop offering ESI in the years after 2014.”  Shubham Singhal, 
Jeris Stueland & Drew Ungerman, How U.S. Health Care Reform Will Affect Employee Benefits, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2011), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health_systems_and_services/ 
how_us_health_care_reform_will_affect_employee_benefits. 
 21.  See Avik Roy, Could Employer Dumping of Health Coverage Reduce the Deficit?, FORBES 
(Mar. 15 2012, 9:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2012/03/15/if-employers-stop-
paying-for-health-care-who-wins-maybe-everyone (“A number of credentialed budget wonks . . . 
have pointed out that the ACA strongly incentivizes employers to drop coverage for their lower-to-
middle-income employees, because those employees get a better deal by seeking out coverage on the 
law’s new exchanges.”); Chriss W. Street, IRS Bars CEOs from Dumping High-Cost Workers on 
Obamacare, BREITBART (May 29, 2014), http://cdn.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/05/28/IRS-
Bars-CEOs-from-Dumping-Sick-Workers-on-Obamacare (“CEOs also expected to be able to ‘game 
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Employees, for their part, have expressed outrage and panic at 
sporadic reports that employers will terminate their group health plans.  
In 2013 and 2014, several large employers, including Walmart, Target, 
Home Depot, Forever 21, and Trader Joe’s, announced that they would 
no longer offer health insurance to part-time employees, citing health 
care reform.22  These concerns, despite the availability of insurance on 
the exchanges and a demonstrated decrease in wages paid in exchange 
for ESI, are a formidable obstacle for health reform. 
Those who oppose the ACA and the media, which generates ratings 
from the panic, stoke the “easily ignited fears of well-insured workers 
that they will be asked to pay more for less.”23  I agree that fear has been 
an impediment to health reform and continues now to be an impediment 
to the implementation of health reform.  My concern here, however, is 
that workers—already being asked by employers to pay more for less—
are instead overvaluing all insurance provided through their employers 
simply because it is provided through their employers.  And the 
government is reinforcing that overvaluation by protecting ESI from 
erosion to the extent possible. 
The result is a stratified system of health insurance in this country 
where both those with ESI and those without feel that the benefits 
provided through ESI are superior.  As long as ESI is considered to be a 
superior form of insurance with more generous benefits that are 
“earned,” coverage purchased on the new exchanges will never be as 
                                                          
 
the system’ to save tens of millions of dollars a year by cost shifting the treatment for their 
chronically sick workers into an Obamacare exchange policy.”); Jay Hancock, Employers Eye 
Moving Sickest Workers to Insurance Exchanges, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 7, 2014), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2014/may/07/shifting-employees-to-exchanges.aspx 
(quoting an executive at a benefits consulting firm who, in regards to the idea that companies may 
shift workers with high medical costs from the company health plan to the health exchanges, stated, 
“‘It’s all over the marketplace . . . . Employers are inquiring about it and brokers and consultants are 
advocating for it’”). 
 22.  Clare O’Connor, Target Joins Home Depot, Walmart, Others in Cutting Health Care for 
Part-Timers, Citing Obamacare, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2014, 1:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
clareoconnor/2014/01/22/target-joins-home-depot-walmart-others-in-dropping-health-care-for-part-
timers-citing-obamacare; Sarah Kliff, Target is Dropping Insurance for Some Because of 
Obamacare.  That Could be Good News for Workers, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/22/target-is-dropping-insurance-for-some-
because-of-obamacare-that-could-be-good-news-for-workers/; Steven Greenhouse & Reed Ableson, 
Wal-Mart Cuts Some Health Care Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.ny 
times.com/2011/10/21/business/wal-mart-cuts-some-health-care-benefits.html (“Citing rising costs, 
Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer, told its employees this week that all future part-time 
employees who work less than 24 hours a week on average will no longer qualify for any of the 
company’s health insurance plans.”). 
 23.  Jacob S. Hacker, Putting Politics First, 27 HEALTH AFF. 718, 720 (2008). 
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successful because those with other options will avoid it at all costs and 
lobby the government for increasing protections for ESI.  I explain why 
we overvalue ESI as a precursor to proposing a solution for devaluing 
ESI. 
A. History of ESI Attachment 
The historical development and tax-favored treatment of ESI 
explains the extent of employee attachment to ESI.24  Because few doubt 
that the attachment runs deep, I include here only a brief background on 
how employers got into the business of providing employees with health 
insurance and the stickiness of the current path. 
Prior to World War II, about 3% of American workers had 
employer-provided health insurance.25  Although welfare capitalists 
experimented with providing health benefits as a way to discourage 
unionization and retain employees,26 it was not until World War II that 
ESI grew and became entrenched.27 
Several factors significantly contributed to the growth of ESI at that 
time.  First, during World War II, the Office of Price Administration put 
in place wage controls but excluded fringe benefits, such as payments for 
worker health insurance, from the definition of wages.28  As a result, 
employers increasingly used health benefits (among other fringe 
                                                          
 24.  See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) (explaining how path dependence shapes 
our current system of health insurance). 
 25.  See Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance After the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 887–88 (2011).  While only 12.3 
million Americans had health insurance in 1940, that number jumped to 122.5 million by 1960.  
Melissa A. Thomasson, From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century Development of U.S. 
Health Insurance, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 233, 233–34 (2002).  By 1958, 75% of 
Americans had health insurance.  Id. at 241. 
 26.  See STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM, 1880-1940 (1976); see also 
JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE (2003). 
 27.  See Brendan S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: Choices, Defaults, and 
the Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099, 1102–03 (2012) (“As the science of medicine became 
more advanced, it offered more cures, for which more people were willing to pay (and pay more), 
than the number of people who were willing to pay (and the amounts they were willing to pay) for 
the more primitive ‘medicine’ of times past.”); Thomasson, supra note 25, at 236–37 (discussing 
how scientific advances spurred increased demand for care by physicians and hospitals and thus 
increased costs for these services and the need for insurance). 
 28.  Moore, supra note 25, at 889. 
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benefits) to attract workers in a tight labor market.29  Over time, 
employees grew accustomed to health insurance provided by employers. 
Second, when veterans re-entered the workforce after the war, they 
brought with them familiarity with government insurance and a new 
value for such benefits provided through employment.30 
Third, unions also influenced the growth of ESI in the 1940s and 
1950s.31  In the late 1940s, unions began to push for health insurance 
during collective bargaining and helped form multiemployer plans that 
covered all employees within a particular industry.32  Multiemployer 
plans were particularly attractive to employees because they allowed 
employees to keep the same health insurance while changing jobs (as 
long as the new job was covered by the same multiemployer plan).33  
Employers increased their health coverage more broadly to discourage 
further unionization.34 
Finally, the tax code has long motivated the growth of ESI.  A 1943 
IRS ruling stated that premiums paid by employers for employee health 
insurance plans were excluded from employees’ income, and employers 
could also deduct the premiums as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses and exclude them for the purpose of other payroll taxes—a 
double tax advantage.35  With marginal tax rates as high as 85% during 
World War II, this meant employees had a choice between 15 cents of 
income or a full dollar of health insurance.36  When the revenue ruling 
was withdrawn in 1953, the tax exemption was formally added to the 
                                                          
 29.  Id.  A 1945 War Labor Board decision that employers could not alter or terminate 
insurance during the contract period increased worker security in their health benefits and thus 
demand for these benefits.  See Thomasson, supra note 25, at 240 n.15. 
 30.  Moore, supra note 25, at 892; Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, Seeking Common 
Ground: A History of Labor and Blue Cross, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 695, 696 (1991). 
 31.  See David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, The Struggle over Employee Benefits: The Role of 
Labor in Influencing Modern Health Policy, 81 MILBANK Q. 45 (2003) (discussing the declining 
role of unions in health policy in the second half of the twentieth century). 
 32.  Moore, supra note 25, at 891. 
 33.  See WOOTEN, supra note 8, at 37 (discussing dynamics of multiemployer pension plans 
which operate by “pooling risks and resources . . . that might be local, regional, or even national in 
scope”). 
 34.  See Moore, supra note 25, at 891–92; see also Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 
(7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (“While, as the Company has demonstrated, a 
reasonable argument can be made that the benefits flowing from such a plan are not ‘wages,’ we 
think the better and more logical argument is on the other side, and certainly there is, in our opinion, 
no sound basis for an argument that such a plan is not clearly included in the phrase, ‘other 
conditions of employment.’”); Markowitz & Rosner, supra note 30 (discussing union involvement in 
the growth of Blue Cross hospital insurance to secure improved worker medical care). 
 35.  Moore, supra note 25, at 889. 
 36.  Id. at 889–90. 
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Internal Revenue Code (IRC),37 demonstrating that Americans had 
become accustomed to ESI and the tax incentives that supported it.38 
In addition to the demand-side factors described above, an increase 
on the supply side also promoted growth at this time.  Hospitals and 
physicians formed Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans respectively to 
provide pre-payment plans for individuals in need of insurance to pay for 
medical expenses.39  The success of these plans pushed commercial 
insurers into the arena.40 
These crucial changes during and after World War II resulted in 
tremendous growth of ESI and the resulting decades in which the vast 
majority of American workers grew accustomed to receiving tax-
subsidized health insurance through employers.41  The influence of path 
dependence on employee attachment to ESI and fears over its change or 
elimination cannot be overstated.  Political scientist Jacob Hacker applies 
the notions of path dependence and critical junctures to the study of the 
development of the American welfare state.42  Hacker first argues that 
path dependence indicates that “timing matters” since policy decisions 
made early in the path have a larger influence than those made later.43  
Second, path dependence assumes a significant amount of “institutional 
inertia” that continues policies put in place at an earlier time.44 
To put it simply, it is difficult to leave the current path.  Once the 
country started down the path of ESI, it developed institutions such as 
tax-incentives that further encouraged ESI.  Similarly, tax-subsidized 
                                                          
 37.  Id. at 890; I.R.C. §§ 105, 106 (2012). 
 38.  See BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34767, THE TAX-EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-
PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: POLICY ISSUES REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE (2008); 
Comment, Employer Health or Accident Plans: Taxfree Protection and Proceeds, 21 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 277 (1954). 
 39.  Thomasson, supra note 25, at 234. 
 40.  See id. at 234, 237–40; Markowitz & Rosner, supra note 30. 
 41.  At $131.7 billion, the tax exclusion for employer contributions to healthcare, health 
insurance, and long-term care insurance remains the largest tax expenditure in the U.S.  See STAFF 
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 38 (Comm. Print 2013).  The tax exclusion is projected to remain the 
largest expenditure, with an estimate of $143 billion for 2014.  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014–
2018, at 31 (Comm. Print 2014). 
 42.  See HACKER, supra note 24, at 52–62; see also Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: 
Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72 (2000); Paul Pierson, 
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000). 
 43.  See HACKER, supra note 24, at 53 (discussing effects of path dependence on public policy). 
 44.  Id. at 52–55; see also James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 
THEORY & SOC’Y 507, 512 (2000) (discussing self-reinforcing sequences).  Even “trivial events” 
may have large effects when “self-reinforcing mechanisms—large set-up or fixed costs, learning 
effects, coordination effects, adaptive expectations—are present.”  HACKER, supra note 24, at 53. 
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health insurance drove up medical costs further and increased the 
importance of insurance coverage.45 
The path has also been sticky for employers.  The growing cost of 
ESI and employers’ reluctance to be in the healthcare business are two 
reasons behind the movement for health reform, but attachment to ESI 
and a tax system that feeds that attachment remain.  There are a 
multitude of books and articles lamenting or defending (and sometimes 
both) the continuing strength of ESI given its “accidental”46 growth 
during and after World War II and the supposed lack of connection 
between employment and employees’ health.47 
For a long time, employers were indifferent between offering 
employees wages or fringe benefits—seeking the optimal combination to 
attract and retain the best-qualified workforce.  Employees may not have 
understood that they were receiving lower wages in exchange for the 
health benefits, but they valued the benefits and tax incentives that 
allowed employers to offer more generous health plans.  For example, 
the average employee essentially has the option of receiving $1 of wages 
or $1.33 of health benefits (excluding discussion of the inflationary 
pressures that the tax subsidies have on the cost of health insurance).48 
But then health costs rose and employers were forced to make 
difficult choices: employers could pay more, or have their employees pay 
more or receive less and suffer the consequences.  Employers forced 
                                                          
 45.  See Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans?, 65 TAX L. REV. 749, 
749–50 (2012) (“The tax preference for employer-sponsored health insurance . . . is thought to 
contribute to rising health expenditures and health insurance premiums by causing individuals to 
purchase coverage that is too generous (a problem referred to in this Article as the problem of 
‘overinsurance’).”). 
 46.  David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins 
and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82, 145 (2006) (“The heavy reliance on employer-
sponsored insurance in the United States is, by many accounts, an accident of history that evolved in 
an unplanned way and, in the view of some, without the benefit of intelligent design.”).  But cf. 
JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF 
THE AMERICAN DREAM 144–46 (2008) (stating that ESI became entrenched as employers found 
private health insurance to be “an increasingly good deal: It bought them loyalty, healthier workers, 
and federal tax breaks”). 
 47.  See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health 
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 23 (2001) (defending ESI in an article that 
opens with the line: “Employment-based health insurance is the Rodney Dangerfield of health 
policy: it gets no respect from anyone”); Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Centered vs. Job-Centered 
Health Insurance, 57 HARV. BUS. REV. 141 (1979) (arguing that ESI results in a lack of competition 
that increases health care costs). 
 48.  See Buchmueller, Carey & Levy, supra note 10, at 1523 (“For a typical worker in the 15 
percent tax bracket, the tax exclusion reduces the cost of insurance by roughly one-third.  For higher-
income workers, the subsidy is even greater.”). 
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employees to pay a larger share of premiums for their health insurance,49 
increased deductibles and co-payments,50 and increasingly turned to co-
insurance.51  Employers also offered less generous health plans, 
including high-deductible health plans and tax-favored individual 
accounts, to assist employees with routine health expenses.52  Employees 
expressed outrage while simultaneously maintaining high levels of 
satisfaction with their health plans because of the lack of better or even 
comparable alternatives that could be purchased with pre-tax dollars.53 
The systemic difficulties associated with deviating from ESI have 
been thoroughly explored in the literature, but this Article asserts that 
scholars have largely ignored the way in which the psychology of fear 
                                                          
 49.  Annual premiums for health benefits through employers rose 80% from 2003 to an average 
of $5,884 for single coverage and $16,351 for family coverage in 2013.  Gary Claxton et al., Health 
Benefits in 2013: Moderate Premium Increases in Employer-Sponsored Plans, 32 HEALTH AFF. 
1667, 1669 (2013).  In 2013, the average worker paid 18% of the premium for single coverage and 
29% of the premium for family coverage.  Id.  Although the percentage of premiums paid by 
workers has not increased dramatically in the last decade (the average worker paid 16% for single 
and 27% for family coverage in 2003), the enormous increase in premium costs overall means both 
employer and employee are paying substantially more in real dollars.  THE KAISER FAM. FOUND. & 
HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY 4 (2003), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/kaiser-family-foundation-2003-
employer-health-benefits-survey-full-report.pdf. 
 50.  The percentage of employees enrolled in a plan with a high annual deductible ($1000 or 
more) has tripled in the past five years, from 9% in 2008 to 28% in 2013; the percentage with a 
deductible of $2000 or more for single coverage quadrupled in the same time period, jumping from 
2% to 8%.  THE KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 
2013 ANNUAL SURVEY 110–11, Exs. 7.9 & 7.10 (2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation. 
files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465-employer-health-benefits-2013_section_72.pdf.  Copayments 
have also increased.  Id.  In 2008, 40% of covered employees had copayments of $10–$20.  Id. at 
130, Ex. 7.29.  In 2013, that percentage was down to 22%, with the majority (55%) of workers 
paying $20–$30 per physician office visit and 21% of workers paying $30–$40 (up from 8% in 
2008).  Id. 
 51.  In 2008, 11% of covered employees had coinsurance.  THE KAISER FAM. FOUND. & 
HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2008 ANNUAL SURVEY 3 (2008), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/7790.pdf.  In 2013, 20% of covered 
employees had plans that required co-insurance.  THE KAISER FAM. FOUND., 2013 ANNUAL SURVEY, 
supra note 50, at 122, Ex. 7.25. 
 52.  In 2003, 5% of employers offered high-deductible insurance plans.  THE KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 49, at 46, Exhibit 2.7.  By 2013, most covered 
employees had high-deductible health plans: 38% of covered workers had deductibles of $1000 or 
more and 15% had deductibles of $2000 or more.  THE KAISER FAM. FOUND., 2013 ANNUAL 
SURVEY, supra note 50, at 109, Exhibit 2.8. 
 53.  In a 2013 survey, 51% of workers with health insurance coverage said they were extremely 
or very satisfied with their current plans, and another 37% were somewhat satisfied.  Paul Fronstein, 
2013 Health and Voluntary Workplace Benefits Survey: Nearly 90% of Workers Satisfied with Their 
Own Health Plan, but 55% Give Low Ratings to Health Care System, EMP. BENEFITS RES. INST. 
NOTES 1 (Sept. 2013), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_09_Sept-13_WBS-Rep 
Rts2.pdf.  Fifty-five percent rated the health care system as fair or poor, however, mainly because of 
rising costs.  Id. 
2015] OVERVALUING EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE 645 
has hindered reform and proposes solutions to this form of “individual” 
path dependence. 
B. Bounded Rationality in ESI and Debiasing Through the ACA 
As discussed above, when health insurance took hold in this country, 
it was connected to employment.  Prior to reaching retirement age and 
accessing Medicare, “good” insurance was available only to those who 
worked—and others did without insurance or suffered the stigma and 
less generous terms of Medicaid.  The traditional American value of 
“earning” social welfare benefits so explicit in our Social Security 
system is also present in our ESI system.54 
For this and other reasons drawn from the law and behavioral science 
literature, I argue that Americans overvalue their ESI regardless of the 
precise benefits offered and wages forfeited as a result.  Legal 
scholarship has increasingly analyzed how human behavior differs from 
the assumption of much economics literature that humans behave with 
unbounded rationality.55  These works seek to answer what—if 
anything—the law should do about these deviations.  In this subsection, I 
explore how individual attachment to ESI is a case of bounded rationality 
and argue that the law can and should reduce or eliminate the cognitive 
biases that cause individuals to make inefficient calculations regarding 
the importance of retaining ESI. 
1. Bounded Rationality 
In recent years, legal scholars have done battle with the traditional 
rational choice theory that underlies most law and economics literature.56  
                                                          
 54.  See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 20 (1971) (“Direct relief [during the Depression] was viewed as a 
temporary expedient, a way of maintaining a person’s body, but not his dignity; a way of keeping the 
populace from shattering in despair, discontent, and disorder, at least for a while, but not of renewing 
their pride, of bringing back a way of life.  For their way of life had been anchored in the discipline 
of work, and so that discipline had to be restored.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (explaining 
why the rationality assumption leads to unsatisfying policy prescriptions and proposing a new 
scholarship paradigm—law and behavioral science); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard 
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); see also 
Maher, supra note 27, at 1106 (“Insurance purchasing is widely believed to be an area in which 
humans are extremely susceptible to cognitive biases and flawed decision-making.”). 
 56.  See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 55 (arguing that law and economics scholarship should 
be transformed into law and behavioral science scholarship that modifies the traditional assumption 
of rationality underlying rational choice theory). 
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Scholars argue first that individuals are “boundedly rational”—meaning 
that “[t]o save time, avoid complexity, and generally make dealing with 
the challenges of daily life tractable, actors often adopt decision 
strategies or employ heuristics that lead to decisions that fail to maximize 
their utility.”57  To put it more simply, individuals have a limited ability 
to absorb all possible information about various choices available and 
must therefore figure out which of that information to include in their 
decision making and how to weigh it.58 
The deviation from unbounded rationality that I am concerned with 
here is the deviation from expected utility theory.59  Nobel Prize winner 
Daniel Kahneman and Psychology Professor Amos Tversky theorized in 
1979 that individuals are focused on how outcomes involve change from 
a starting point—instead of a neutral analysis of the benefits and 
drawbacks of the outcome itself.60  Their “prospect theory” argues that 
people demonstrate loss aversion by “weigh[ing] losses more heavily 
than gains.”61 
Prospect theory is based on the endowment effect, or the idea that 
individuals value an item more highly if they already own it than if they 
have to purchase it.62  Because people weigh losses so heavily, it matters 
                                                          
 57.  Id. at 1143. 
 58.  Id.  Scholars argue that preferences are also determined by “context”—meaning that 
“[c]hoices are not made merely by comparing decision outcomes; situational variables are critical 
inputs into decision making.”  Id. 
 59.  The other category of deviation from unbounded rationality is judgment errors.  Christine 
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 203–05 (2006); see also 
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 55, at 1062 (discussing how expected utility theory is considered 
“thin” rational choice theory because it does not state what individuals’ goals or preferences are). 
 60.  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979) (demonstrating that “people normally perceive outcomes 
as gains and losses, rather than as final states of wealth or welfare” and start from a neutral reference 
point of the status quo). 
 61.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 205; see also Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 60, at 
279 (“The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the 
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount.”); see Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and 
Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA, 36 J. CORP. L. 781, 796 (2011) (arguing that loss aversion 
may reduce the likelihood that individuals will choose to pay the tax penalty instead of paying for 
health insurance since paying the mandate “represents a pure loss”). 
 62.  See Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, 
the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting 
Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 530 n.1 (2005) (explaining that the gap between how much 
someone is willing to pay for an item and the amount they are willing to accept for an item is 
attributed by some to loss aversion and has thus come to be termed the “endowment effect”); Daniel 
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and 
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990) (noting that Richard H. Thaler coined the 
phrase “endowment effect” to represent the increased value that is bestowed upon a good when it 
becomes part of an individual’s endowment). 
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significantly if outcomes are framed as losses or gains.63  This matters 
“because the endowment effect is often linked to a desire by entitlement 
holders to avoid regretting a bad decision to engage in a transaction (sale 
of the entitlement).”64  Legal scholarship on the endowment effect and its 
role in the law has proliferated.65 
Few doubt that attachment to ESI is a significant impediment to a 
dramatic overhaul of our healthcare system.  But attachment to ESI is 
wrapped up in feelings about the value of employment, attachment to 
particular doctors covered by the plan’s network, familiarity with the 
procedures for payment or reimbursement under a particular plan, and 
much more. 
Several experimental findings show why the endowment effect is 
increased in the health insurance context.66  The effect is amplified 
where: (1) the value of the entitlement is uncertain; (2) the entitlement is 
thought of as a “baseline” instead of a “bonus”; (3) the “evolutionary 
salience” of the entitlement is high (close connection between the item 
and survival); (4) the entitlement is assessed for its “use value” (e.g., the 
value of receiving quality medical care for a low to moderate cost) 
instead of for its “exchange value” (e.g., what such health insurance 
                                                          
 63.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 205–06.  However, the endowment effect is 
significantly reduced, if not altogether eliminated, when the decision maker is acting on behalf of 
another.  Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects Within Corporate 
Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2002). 
 64.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 223. 
 65.  See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 
1236 (2003) (explaining that the existence and magnitude of the endowment effect depends on the 
context so that when a good or entitlement is earned, the endowment effect is more pronounced).  
But recent scholarship has called into question the existence of an endowment effect.  Professors 
Gregory Klass and Kathryn Zeiler argue that legal scholars have ignored other potential reasons for 
the desire not to part with entitlements.  See Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment 
Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2013).  The authors 
also note that: 
In order to argue that a given legal entitlement was likely to affect people’s preferences, 
one had to tell a story about why that entitlement was likely to result in a change in 
valuation.  That story might include causes cognizable under traditional economic theory, 
such as wealth effects or increased knowledge about the object of the entitlement.  It 
might involve biases or heuristics, such as buy-low/sell-high bargaining habits.  Or it 
might involve observations about the affective aspects of ownership, such as the 
attachment people feel toward some possessions, the felt need to remove some spheres of 
life from the marketplace, or the tendency to treat legal assignments as presumptively 
correct.  The effect of endowment theory has been to flip the burden of persuasion. 
Id. at 26. 
 66.  See Justin L. Bernstein, Controlling Medicare with Lessons from Endowment Effect 
Experiments, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 174–78 (2013) (describing how “perception” and “context” 
affect the strength of the endowment effect in order to reduce the endowment effect and its 
consequences for Medicare). 
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would cost on an open market); and (5) the entitlement is held for a long 
time period.67 
Even a quick application of these findings to the ESI context shows 
why individuals are so protective of their employment-based coverage.  
First, the value of ESI is uncertain.  Determining the value of ESI is 
difficult given that the value of tax subsidies depends on the employee’s 
bracket, and the precise reduction of wages used to “purchase” this 
benefit is difficult to quantify.  Second, after many years, ESI has come 
to be viewed as a baseline benefit to which those who work are 
entitled—particularly for middle and high-income workers.  Third, in a 
time where the connection of high-quality medical care to longevity is 
clear and poor health insurance frequently results in ruinous financial 
consequences, the “evolutionary salience” of health insurance is high.  
Fourth, employees overvalue ESI because they focus on what ESI does 
for them—the value of having access to medical care—instead of the 
dollars and cents cost of purchasing a comparable insurance policy 
elsewhere.  Finally, the majority of full-time workers have had ESI for 
most or all of their careers and have often been participants of the same 
health plans for many years—increasing their connection to this benefit. 
Those with ESI demonstrate an inefficient attachment to their 
insurance, as manifested in recent outrage at the thought that employers 
may force or push some or all of their employees into the individual 
exchanges created under the ACA.  Most employees know little about 
how their insurance plans would be different on the exchanges or the 
extent of any possible decrease in employer subsidies not offset by 
higher wages from employers no longer paying those subsidies.  Despite 
this, they fear the loss of their ESI with a ferocity that doomed previous 
efforts at health reform.68 
                                                          
 67.  See id.  Bernstein’s article describes seven experimental findings that amplify the 
endowment effect.  I have chosen five that I believe are most relevant in the ESI context. 
 68.  See Jonathan Oberlander, Health Care Reform’s Failure: The Song Remains the Same, 24 
HEALTH AFF. 1679, 1680 (2005) (“One reason that those with a stake in maintaining the status quo 
have been able to shake public support for particular reforms is that the status quo does not seem like 
a bad fallback option for the comfortably insured.”).  One fruitful area of research would be to 
compare the satisfaction levels of individuals with substantially similar health insurance policies 
purchased on the exchange with those provided through employment.  If employees with coverage 
through ESI exhibit higher levels of satisfaction for the same policies, then insurance provided 
through employment is valued more highly even if the policy terms are the same.  Kahneman & 
Tversky, supra note 60, at 286.  Kahneman and Tversky state that any theory of insurance behavior 
should include more than just a rational calculation of the probabilities of risks (i.e., health risks) and 
include factors such as the benefit of “security,” the norm of “prudence,” the ability to pay for 
insurance in small installments over a long time horizon, and information and misinformation on the 
occurrence of risks (among other factors).  Id. 
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2. Debiasing 
Showing that individuals are boundedly rational when it comes to 
retaining their ESI, however, does not necessarily imply that the law 
needs to intervene.  While traditional law and economics literature is 
“antipaternalistic”—advocating unrestricted choice with unfettered 
access to relevant information necessary to make that choice 
meaningful—the recent focus on bounded rationality “pushes toward a 
sort of anti-antipaternalism—a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not 
an affirmative defense of paternalism.”69  Professor of Behavioral 
Science and Economics Richard Thaler and Law Professor Cass 
Sunstein, for example, argue that “there is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ 
design.”70  They seek to initiate a new movement called “libertarian 
paternalism.”71  As part of their movement, it is permissible to help 
people improve their lives through making informed decisions with a 
“nudge”—or many nudges.72 
Debiasing, or nudging, through substantive law suggests that in some 
cases it may be desirable to “reform”—or manipulate—the “substance of 
law” to allay the effects of bounded rationality.73  This method involves 
eliminating or reducing the commonly observed gap between 
“individuals’ willingness to accept—the amount at which they would sell 
an entitlement—[and] their willingness to pay—the amount they would 
pay to purchase the same entitlement.”74 
One example of debiasing through law provided by Christine Jolls 
and Cass Sunstein is a comparison of intellectual property law in Europe 
and the United States.  Those with intellectual property entitlements can 
be subject to a property rule as in the United States (i.e., they need not 
allow others to use their entitlement unless they agree—usually after 
demanding a steep price) or a liability rule as in Europe (i.e., they may be 
required to permit others to use their entitlement and then they will be 
                                                          
 69.  Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 55, at 1541. 
 70.  See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3–4 (2008) (arguing that “[g]ood architects realize that although 
they can’t build the perfect building, they can make some design choices that will have beneficial 
effects”). 
 71.  Id. at 5.  Thaler and Sunstein recognize the backlash likely to result from their use of this 
phrase but argue in favor of intervention that promotes informed choice. 
 72.  See id. at 6 (explaining that employers and the government are key choice architects who 
nudge employees with respect to healthcare decisions). 
 73.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 202. 
 74.  Id. at 220. 
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compensated with set damages).75  Evidence shows that the use of a 
liability rule in Europe brings willingness to accept down to willingness 
to pay, likely because there is less of a feeling of ownership over the 
entitlement and thus there are less emotions involved—allowing 
rationality back in to the decision making process.76 
Jolls and Sunstein’s discussion of debiasing through agency law is 
particularly relevant in the context of employers making decisions 
regarding available health insurance options on behalf of employees.  
There is evidence that managers acting on behalf of a corporation 
through an agency relationship demonstrate almost no endowment 
effect—meaning they do not demonstrate a willingness to accept over a 
willingness to pay.77  This evidence is likely the result of both the 
business context and the agency relationship.78  The business context 
makes it less likely that individuals will have an exaggerated willingness 
to accept since the business must sell to survive.79  The agency 
relationship also is likely to reduce or eliminate the endowment effect 
because it reduces the personal investment in the entitlement and thus the 
emotions resulting in a fear of loss.80 
The evidence that business managers show little to no endowment 
effect helps explain why employers appear to be more willing to make 
rational decisions after the ACA regarding whether to continue offering 
ESI.  They seem ready to make financial calculations that would lead to a 
more efficient and less stratified health financing system—except for 
impediments put in place by government actors and employees. 
There are of course problems with attempts to debias boundedly 
rational individuals.  One problem with debiasing for deviations from the 
expected utility theory is that the individuals show no clear error—there 
is no obvious mistake.81  Perhaps individuals simply prefer to receive 
health insurance through their employers.  The benefits then feel 
“earned.”  There are also economies of scale because administrative 
expenses for insurance companies are reduced when insurance is offered 
to a large group through an employer instead of on the individual market.  
                                                          
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 220–22 (focusing on the situations in which either willingness to accept or 
willingness to pay should be the measure of value used (based, of course, on judgments of 
regulators, which are themselves subject to bias)).  
 77.  Id. at 223. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 223–24. 
 81.  Id. at 219. 
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Employees may believe that employers can more quickly and easily 
decide what type of health coverage they need since it requires wading 
through information and making a calculation as to the risk that 
employees will need coverage for various types of healthcare. 
There is nothing wrong per se with a system where employees want 
employers to offer health insurance for these reasons and thus overvalue 
the benefit, unless it: (1) harms exchange-based insurance and (2) denies 
employers the ability to use HRAs to subsidize the purchase of insurance 
by their employees on the exchanges.  Even if both employers and 
employees are satisfied with the system, I here make a normative 
argument that third parties outside the ESI relationship (i.e., those who 
purchase exchange-based insurance) should not be harmed by the 
continuation of the current ESI system.  I also argue that employees 
would likely not be happy if they fully understood the tradeoffs and 
distortions on their health insurance costs and policies resulting from tax 
subsidies and penalties, and the tradeoff between employer subsidies for 
health insurance costs and wages.82 
One reason to debias in spite of concerns about government 
manipulation is that it promotes choice—a central component of the 
defined contribution revolution discussed above—mitigating against 
concerns of paternalism.83  “[A] special virtue of debiasing through law 
is that . . . it maximizes the preservation of people’s opportunity to make 
choices.  Instead of blocking decisions, it is preferable to attempt to 
                                                          
 82.  “A more fundamental concern with debiasing through law involves individual autonomy.  
When government is engaged in (what it considers to be) debiasing, there is a risk that it will 
manipulate its citizens to serve its own objectives.”  Id. at 231.  With debiasing, the government 
attempts to alter the way people think about (in this case) their health financing and their behavior 
based on that framework—resulting in normative considerations of whether this is advisable.  Id. at 
202–03.  Normative concerns of debiasing are exacerbated by the fact that government actors who 
would in the case of health insurance seek to debias individuals are themselves subject to bounded 
rationality regarding the value of ESI.  See id. at 233 (“No less than ordinary people, bureaucrats use 
heuristics and are subject to predictable biases; they are also susceptible to the influence of powerful 
private groups with stakes in the outcome.  In fact, the very accountability of bureaucrats suggests 
that they will be affected by the bounded rationality of the citizenry.”). 
 83.  See id. at 202 (“More generally, rules and institutions might be, and frequently are, 
designed to curtail or even entirely block choice in the hope that legal outcomes will not fall prey to 
problems of bounded rationality.”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for 
Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003) (expressing concern that paternalism abrogates 
individual choice).  But see Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is Watching 
You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685 (2009) (arguing that the “new” 
or “soft” paternalism of scholars such as Jolls and Sunstein is not without risk on that famously 
slippery slope); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas G. Whitman, Paternalist Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 411 (2007) (arguing that policymaking based on paternalism should be considered with 
trepidation). 
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improve decision making.”84  I am here focused on debiasing to decrease 
government intervention—fewer barriers between ESI and the 
exchanges—making paternalism less of an issue (although still a 
concern).  Removing the impediments to those with ESI choosing to 
purchase insurance on the exchanges—and particularly allowing 
employers to subsidize that purchase—provides employees with more 
options regarding the type of health insurance plan that best meets their 
needs.  Once they need to make choices about what type of insurance to 
purchase, instead of simply allowing employers to make those choices 
for them, many employees will pursue knowledge that helps them make 
better decisions about what health plans to purchase.  For those who 
continue to engage in flawed health insurance decision making, the 
outcome for them will be no different than allowing their employers to 
select plans that do not fit their needs. 
Equally as important to my argument, considering that I here explore 
how individuals are not behaving rationally when deciding what health 
insurance to purchase, I am not concerned with nudging all or even most 
individuals to suddenly engage in rational decision making in this area.  
Some employers, who for reasons discussed above are more likely to 
behave rationally when designing their health benefits offered to 
workers, will nudge employees into the exchanges if distortions caused 
by tax subsidies and penalties are eliminated.  Those who want to 
diminish their healthcare expenses on behalf of workers or decrease the 
administrative burden of interacting directly with insurers or 
administrators will nudge employees in that direction.  Whether or not 
employees presented with new health insurance make better choices 
about what plans to purchase on the exchanges, more and better choices 
will then be available to all in the newly expanded markets. 
Instead of preserving the overvaluation of ESI, the government also 
needs to debias to prevent the creation of a second class of citizens who 
purchase health insurance through the exchanges only because they do 
not have access to ESI.  The ongoing overvaluation of ESI, particularly 
because most workers fail to understand the tradeoff between wages and 
health benefits, hurts: (1) workers who overvalue health benefits when 
making dollar and cents calculations about employment, (2) individuals 
who purchase insurance that is considered by society to be inferior on the 
exchanges, and (3) health reform advocates who want robust exchanges 
                                                          
 84.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 226 (citations omitted) (“It is a familiar point that 
choice-preserving remedies of this general nature are valuable because they acknowledge both that 
individuals have diverse preferences and that planners may err . . . .”). 
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with high participation rates.  First, workers who overvalue health 
benefits are likely to remain in jobs with generous benefits even when 
presented with other opportunities that have proportionately higher 
wages that compensate for a decline in health benefits.  This also allows 
employers to pay less in total compensation by maintaining relatively 
generous health benefits.  Second, as long as individuals prefer ESI to 
comparable policies available on the exchanges, there will be a stigma 
attached to health insurance that is not connected to employment.  This 
will further exacerbate the socioeconomic differentiation already taking 
place in the health insurance market and prevent the further 
commodification of insurance.  Third, as long as ESI is overvalued, 
fewer workers will move from ESI to the exchanges.  This means fewer 
insurance plans offered in the exchanges and at higher costs (either 
because the pool is riskier or because there are fewer participants to 
divide administrative expenses among).  Again, this hurts those who 
must purchase insurance in the exchanges because those with ESI can 
avoid these harms by staying out of the exchanges.  I speculate that 
debiasing will increase the popularity of the ACA as Americans finally 
gain familiarity with a health insurance system that includes, but is not 
reliant on, ESI. 
While tax subsidies and penalties may be framed as protecting 
employees’ choice of ESI, if ESI is such an essential component of the 
compensation package then it will continue to exist largely in its current 
form even without the advantage of being the only tax-subsidized 
insurance choice for most employees.  This is because employees will 
migrate to jobs with generous ESI if employers eliminate or degrade 
their plans.  Although a pure free market may not be the goal here,85 
recent attempts to impede the natural evolution of health reform are an 
overreaction.  In this case, employees should not be separated from the 
choices available on the exchanges because of the artificial distortion of 
tax subsidies and penalties.86  There is no free choice in health insurance 
when taxes subsidize ESI heavily and make any other choice unlikely. 
                                                          
 85.  The private health insurance market is already far from the perfect example of capitalism in 
action that many make it out to be.  A dozen insurance companies cover two-thirds of Americans, 
and they are heavily regulated by the states already.  Robert E. Moffit, Expanding Choice Through 
Defined Contributions: Overcoming a Non-participatory Health Care Economy, 40 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 558, 561 (2012). 
 86.  Such access can and should be available to low-income individuals.  Switzerland, 
employing a similar healthcare exchange system that requires every citizen to purchase at least a 
basic insurance plan and provides subsidies for low-income individuals, now has a 98% insurance 
rate, although the government only pays for 24.9% of total health care expenditures in the country.  
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III. IMPACT OF ESI ATTACHMENT ON ACA 
Much of the news coverage on the implementation of the ACA has 
focused on questions about whether employers are making plans to move 
employees into the exchanges.87  Scholars and benefit administrators 
contemplated ways that employers could terminate or gut their health 
plans and use individual accounts—such as HRAs—as tax-preferred 
vehicles for subsidizing the cost of premiums for health insurance 
purchased on the exchanges.88  Even worse, they theorized that 
employers could incentivize select groups of employees to purchase 
health insurance on the exchanges instead of through their employers.89  
These methods largely involved savvy employers designing their group 
health plans to make them undesirable to low-income or less healthy 
employees (the stick) and then—as necessary—subsidizing the purchase 
of health insurance on the exchanges with pre-tax subsidies provided to 
                                                          
 
Mason Felton Reid, Health Care for Low-Income Classes in an Individual Mandate System: Lessons 
the United States Can Learn from Switzerland, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 803, 827–28 (2013). 
 87.  See Robb Mandelbaum, Would You Try This Health Insurance Strategy with Your 
Company?, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2014, 11:43 AM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/ 
would-you-try-this-health-insurance-strategy-with-your-company/?_r=0 (noting that Zane Benefits, 
an employee benefits consultant, was offering a product that would allow employers to reimburse 
employees for the purchase of health insurance on the exchanges and discussing the Obama 
administration’s and IRS’s opposition to such an arrangement). 
 88.  See Robert Pear, I.R.S. Bars Employers from Dumping Workers into Health Exchanges, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2014, at A12 (“Many employers had thought they could shift health costs to 
the government by sending their employees to a health insurance exchange with a tax-free 
contribution of cash to help pay premiums . . . .”); Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will 
Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 130 
(2011) (“[E]mployers that pursue a dumping strategy can provide all migrating employees with a 
contribution to a health reimbursement arrangement (‘HRA’) equivalent to—or even larger than—
the amount that the employer ordinarily contributes to an employee’s coverage.  High-risk 
employees can then use this amount, which is excluded from the employee’s taxable income, to 
purchase coverage on the individual market.”). 
 89.  See Jay Hancock, Employers Eye Moving Sickest Workers to Insurance Exchanges, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (May 7, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/shifting-employees-to-exchanges 
(describing how employers might shift workers with high medical costs to the exchanges); David 
Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further 
Reforms are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX. L. 
REV. 669, 693 (2012); Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 88; Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Can You 
Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits of Grandfathering under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 753, 774–75 (2011) (discussing the possibility that employers will use required vouchers 
for low-income employees to push those workers into the exchanges).  But cf. Suja A. Thomas & 
Peter Molk, Employer Costs and Conflict Under the Affordable Care Act, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
ONLINE 56, 57 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/10/99CLRO56-October.pdf (arguing 
that additional protections are needed to ensure that employers do not threaten or harass employees 
for enrolling in coverage on the exchanges under the ACA and costing their employers more). 
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employees through HRAs to be used to pay all or part of premiums on 
these individual policies (the carrot).90 
Although relying on employer penalties to keep most employers 
from eliminating their ESI, the administration appears to have been 
particularly concerned that employers would use HRAs to make tax-
favored contributions that employees could use to subsidize in part or 
whole the purchase of health insurance on the exchanges created under 
the ACA.  Such an arrangement would allow employees to continue to 
use the tax exclusion given to employers to pay for ESI premiums 
without any income or payroll taxes applied while purchasing insurance 
on the exchanges.91  As discussed further below, the IRS recently issued 
additional guidance confirming that this practice will not be permitted, 
and employers cannot subsidize the purchase of insurance by employees 
on the exchanges using pre-tax funds.92 
A. Fears of Employee Dumping 
1. Employers May Dump All Employees 
The central debate on the implementation of the ACA is whether 
employers will “pay” or “play”—that is, will employers elect to pay the 
penalties for not offering health insurance under the ACA instead of 
continuing to play by offering employer-sponsored group health plans.  
Most analyses of whether employers will continue to play the game 
assume that employers are rational actors and that their only motivation 
for offering ESI is because employees want health insurance and this 
motivation is balanced by increasing costs not fully offset by wage 
decreases.  Given rising costs for ESI (to employers and employees) and 
the alternative now offered for employees to purchase insurance on the 
exchanges, employers are more likely than ever to make rational 
decisions regarding whether to offer health insurance and what type of 
health insurance to offer.93 
                                                          
 90.  See Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 781, 796 (2011) (discussing the carrot and stick in the context of individual tax credits and 
the individual mandate). 
 91.  See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 88, at 161–63 (discussing how employers could use 
HRAs when dumping employees into the exchanges, including creating a debit card program so 
employees would not have to pay the premiums up front). 
 92.  Employer Health Care Arrangements, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Employer 
-Health-Care-Arrangements (last updated Mar. 2, 2015). 
 93.  In addition, research suggests that the imposition of monetary penalties can have 
consequences other than the anticipated deterrence effect.  See generally Uri Gneezy & Aldo 
Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (presenting a field study in which parents 
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The possibility that employers may terminate their group health 
plans or instead incentivize employees to buy coverage on the exchanges 
is important for several reasons.  First, if employees lose ESI, there will 
undoubtedly be more individuals who receive premium tax credits to 
purchase insurance on the exchanges or Medicaid.  Next, if the 
employers who drop all coverage had a relatively less healthy workforce, 
this will drive up the average cost to insure a participant on the exchange 
(because participants are on average less healthy now) and increase 
premiums for everyone.  Finally, as I have noted repeatedly, most 
Americans with ESI like their coverage and do not want to lose it.94 
Any discussion of whether employers may decide to eliminate ESI as 
a result of the ACA should begin with a look at how the ACA changes 
employer incentives to offer health insurance to their workers.95  Under 
the ACA, employers with 50 or more full-time employees for over 120 
days in a calendar year face a penalty if any of their workers qualifies for 
a premium tax credit.96  Workers are entitled to the premium tax credit if 
their employer does not offer health coverage or if that coverage is not 
“affordable” (i.e., the worker’s share of the premium for single coverage 
exceeds 9.5% of income) or does not provide minimum value (i.e., the 
worker pays at least 40% of the cost of the benefits provided under the 
plan).97  If an employer does not offer a group health plan, that penalty 
for the employer is $2,000 per worker after the first 30 workers.98  If an 
employer offers health coverage but it is not affordable or does not 
provide minimum value, the penalty is the lesser of (a) the 
aforementioned penalty for employers who do not offer any coverage, 
and (b) $3,000 for each full-time worker who receives the premium tax 
credit.99 
To understand why employers may drop their group health coverage 
as a result, one needs to focus on the reasons that employers offer such 
                                                          
 
were fined for picking up their children late from school to demonstrate that monetary penalties do 
not always result in deterrence). 
 94.  See Buchmueller, Carey & Levy, supra note 10. 
 95.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012) (holding that the 
individual mandate is permissible under the federal government’s constitutional power to tax even 
though it is “intended to affect individual conduct”).  Similarly, the employer mandate is designed to 
affect corporate conduct. 
 96.  I.R.C. § 4980H (2012). 
 97.  Id. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii). 
 98.  Id. § 4980H. 
 99.  Id.  See Buchmueller, Carey & Levy, supra note 10, at 1525, Exhibit 3; Gamage, supra 
note 89, at 693. 
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coverage.100  First, employers have a comparative advantage as health 
insurance providers because of tax incentives and economies of scale.  
ESI premiums are excluded from income and payroll taxes—effectively 
subsidizing the cost of insurance by one-third for the average worker and 
more for the highly compensated.  Employers are able to provide an 
adequate risk pool for insurance where the healthy subsidize the sick and 
to predict health costs from year to year based on past experience.  
Administrative and marketing costs are largely fixed, so sharing them 
among a large group allows each participant to pay less for these costs.101  
Second, workers pay for the benefits indirectly through lower wages.  
Since health insurance premiums are tax-subsidized and employers 
arguably are indifferent between paying employees in wages and health 
benefits, employees typically find this to be a worthwhile tradeoff or are 
unaware that they are making a tradeoff.102  Third, the benefits offered to 
workers are (mostly) responsive to their demands.  Employers balance 
the needs of a large and sometimes diverse group of employees to 
achieve the optimal balance of wages and health benefits and provide 
desirable options for employees.  And, if that balance is not always 
optimal, most employees seem satisfied as indicated by their 
overwhelming support for their own health insurance arrangements.103  
These factors motivating employers to offer ESI have not changed.  
Some, however, argue that the penalties under the ACA for not offering 
the required insurance are low compared to the costs employers pay for 
health insurance and provide incentive to discontinue their plans.104 
Unless employees’ attachment to ESI is reduced, employers are 
unlikely to eliminate their group health plans without substantial 
financial incentives.  If employees continue to overvalue ESI, then 
simply increasing their wages proportionately as their health plans are 
eliminated will not be sufficient compensation to satisfy employees.  If 
exchanges are healthy and have comparable options, however, then 
employees should be more amenable to purchasing insurance on the 
exchanges if they can purchase plans using pre-tax funds and employer 
subsidies.  The perceived decrease in value resulting from not receiving 
                                                          
 100.  See Buchmueller, Carey & Levy, supra note 10, at 1523 (“Employers are not currently 
required to provide health insurance, yet most of them do: Nearly 80 percent of full-time workers are 
eligible for employer-sponsored coverage.”). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See David Pratt, Health Care Reform: Will It Succeed?, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 493, 546 
(2011). 
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those benefits directly through an employer would be mitigated by the 
financial comparability and the continuing involvement of the employer 
through funding provided for premiums. 
2. Employers May Dump Some Employees 
Various nondiscrimination and ACA employer mandate provisions 
are also likely to motivate employers to continue their ESI.105  Employers 
are prohibited from discriminating against workers based on their health 
status and their income level when administering their group health 
plans.  Prior to the ACA, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 amended the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to add rules that prevented discrimination 
based on health status in determining eligibility or premiums for group 
health plans.106  These restrictions do not, however, require an employer 
or an insurance company to offer a particular type of benefit or level of 
coverage in a group health plan.107  The ACA’s nondiscrimination 
                                                          
 105.  Group health plans also may not discriminate in favor of more highly compensated workers 
in determining enrollment eligibility or benefits for group health plans, or they risk having the highly 
compensated forfeit the valuable tax exclusion for premium contribution.  I.R.C. § 105(h) (2012).  
The ACA extends this prohibition beyond self-insured plans to more traditional insured products.  
PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1001, § 2716, 124 Stat. 119, 135 (2010) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-16 (2012)).  Employers can use eligibility criteria that have a discriminatory 
impact on less highly compensated workers, however, or simply raise premiums.  See Monahan & 
Schwarcz, supra note 88, at 187 (stating that distinguishing among employees based on geographic 
restrictions, for example, would be acceptable).  But see Robertson, supra note 6, at 290–91 (“The 
IRS has preserved an ultimate discretion to examine plans pragmatically based on a finding of 
discriminatory impact, regardless of the mechanism.”). 
 106.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, sec. 
101(a), § 702, 110 Stat. 1936, 1945 (1996) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012)). 
 107.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 702(a), 88 Stat. 
829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012)).  ERISA § 702(a), provides:  
[P]aragraph (1) [of this statute] shall not be construed—(A) to require a group health 
plan, or group health insurance coverage, to provide particular benefits other than those 
provided under the terms of such plan or coverage, or (B) to prevent such a plan or 
coverage from establishing limitations or restrictions on the amount, level, extent, or 
nature of the benefits or coverage for similarly situated individuals enrolled in the plan or 
coverage. 
Id.  
ERISA § 510 further provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or 
discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is 
entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this title, section 3001, or the 
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act [(29 U.S.C.A. 301 et seq.)], or for the purpose 
of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become 
entitled under the plan, this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. 
Id. § 510 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012)).  See generally McGann v. H & H Music 
Co., 946 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring a showing of discriminatory intent rather than 
 
2015] OVERVALUING EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE 659 
provision is similar to those already contained within ERISA.108  This 
failure to require specific benefits and levels of coverage is where the 
opportunity to selectively dump employees under the ACA finds an 
opening. 
The application of penalties if an employer fails to offer ESI to part 
of its workforce will, in certain circumstances, also help to prevent 
selective dumping of workers into the exchanges.  The $2,000 penalty 
for failing to offer a group health plan is assessed based on the 
employer’s number of full-time workers—not the number of employees 
excluded from coverage.109  The penalty, however, only applies if 
employers do not offer employees coverage.110  It does nothing to 
prevent an employer from offering unaffordable coverage to a set of 
workers that would allow them to qualify for subsidies on the 
exchanges.111  The $3,000 penalty for offering these employees 
unaffordable coverage is based on the number of employees receiving 
the premium tax credit and limited by the maximum employer mandate 
penalty.112 
The structure of the ACA also encourages employers to drop low-
income employees.113  David Gamage claims that the “ACA will induce 
employers to stop offering ‘affordable’ health insurance to at least some 
                                                          
 
effect where employer reduced coverage for AIDS and AIDS-related illnesses from $1,000,000 
lifetime maximum to $5,000 after plaintiff filed a claim). 
 108.  See PPACA, sec. 1201, § 2705; Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 88, at 146 (noting that 
the ACA’s provision is “largely duplicative” of HIPAA’s prohibition and emphasizing that only 
direct discrimination is truly prohibited). 
 109.  Gamage, supra note 89, at 693. 
 110.  Id. at 694. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Concerns about employers dropping health coverage only for low-income workers are 
well-founded based on a comparison with changes to private pensions after the government entered 
with a public program to meet minimum retirement income needs.  The Social Security Act of 1935 
created a basic public pension program for workers based on years of service and wage rate, 
allowing private pension plans to focus on more highly compensated workers.  COLIN GORDON, 
NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1920-1935 2–3 (1994).  Employers 
were left to fill the gap between Social Security payments and the amount employees wanted and 
needed for retirement.  WOOTEN, supra note 8, at 27.  Since higher wage earners expected larger 
pensions, private plans focused mainly on the highly paid by integrating Social Security benefits into 
their pension calculations (i.e., either excluding from participation or paying a reduced benefit to 
those who earned less than the maximum wages taxable under Social Security).  Id. at 27, 29.  Since 
health plans, like pension plans, are a tool used by employers to retain key employees, it is likely 
that employers would prefer a stratified system that focused on providing pricier, more 
comprehensive health coverage to the more highly compensated employees that they seek to retain.  
See generally Chuck Slusher, Pension Integration and Social Security Reform, 61 SOC. SECURITY 
BULL. 20, 21 (1998). 
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low- and moderate-income employees.”114  The ACA creates a 
“mismatch . . . between the tax subsidies available for employer-
sponsored health insurance and those available for the health insurance 
purchased by individuals.”115  Due to income differences and higher 
marginal tax rates, more highly compensated workers will receive greater 
tax breaks through ESI, but low-income workers will receive more 
valuable tax breaks if they can purchase insurance on the exchanges.116 
Employees who earn up to 400% of the federal poverty level will be 
eligible for a premium tax credit to subsidize the purchase of health 
insurance on the exchanges.117  The amount of the premium tax credits 
depends on household income, the cost of premiums for the benchmark 
plan used to determine credits, and the number of eligible family 
members.118  Low-income individuals are expected to contribute 
somewhere between 2% and 9.5% of their incomes towards insurance.119  
Employees purchasing insurance on the exchanges may also receive 
cost-sharing subsidies to use towards deductibles, copayments, and 
coinsurance.120  The range in value of tax subsidies available to 
employees who purchase insurance for a family of four on the exchanges 
in 2016 is $4,570 where household income is 400% of the federal 
poverty line to $18,432 where household income is only 100% of the 
federal poverty line.121 
These valuable tax subsidies for purchasing insurance on the 
exchanges, however, are not available if the employee has the ability to 
purchase “affordable” ESI.122  As a result, employees lack the ability to 
                                                          
 114.  Gamage, supra note 89, at 671–72; see also Hyman, supra note 16, at 14 (“Another 
provision in PPACA creates an additional incentive for employers to drop coverage; if the coverage 
they offer is ‘unaffordable,’ they must pay an additional penalty.  ‘Affordable’ is defined in terms of 
the percentage of an employee’s household income that must be spent on health insurance 
premiums.  According to one survey, roughly one-third of employers had some workers for whom 
coverage might be ‘unaffordable.’”). 
 115.  Gamage, supra note 89, at 672. 
 116.  Id.  To further complicate matters, a case pending before the Supreme Court questions 
whether the ACA permits the IRS to issue premium tax credits to those who purchase insurance 
through exchanges operated by the federal government instead of state governments.  See King v. 
Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (upholding IRS rule). 
 117.  Gamage, supra note 89, at 687–88. 
 118.  Id. at 687. 
 119.  Id. at 687–88. 
 120.  Id. at 688.  Low-income workers who purchase insurance on the healthcare exchanges will 
also benefit from the elimination of cost-sharing for preventive services and general caps on cost-
sharing for other services.  Reid, supra note 86, at 827–28.  By expanding access and encouraging 
preventive care, more people will receive basic and routine medical care. 
 121.  Gamage, supra note 89, at 688, Table 1. 
 122.  As discussed above, insurance is affordable if it requires an employee to pay less than 9.5% 
of household income for a single policy.  Id. at 689. 
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choose between tax subsidies on the exchanges and those offered through 
ESI.123  In addition, if an employee has the option of enrolling in 
affordable ESI (determined based on the cost of single coverage rather 
than family coverage), the employee’s whole family is ineligible for tax 
subsidies to purchase insurance on the exchanges.124  The break-even 
point to determine when an employee would be better off choosing to 
purchase insurance on the exchanges is when single household income is 
between 350% and 375% of the federal poverty line (depending on 
assumptions used).125  Employees would thus be better off if employers 
do not offer ESI to employees earning below the break-even point 
because they would receive the more valuable tax subsidies. 
Scholars and the media at large have also focused on the possibility 
that employers will selectively push employees with expensive health 
conditions or those more likely to develop those conditions (high-risk 
employees) onto the exchanges.  In 2011, Amy Monahan and Daniel 
Schwarcz published an article calling attention to loopholes in the ACA 
that made it possible for employers subject to the ACA tax penalties to 
incentivize high-risk employees to purchase insurance on the exchanges, 
leaving employers to cover low-risk employees at a reduced cost while 
avoiding individual or employer penalties.126  By offering ESI that 
catered to low-risk employees and then using money in an HRA to 
subsidize the cost of purchasing more expansive coverage on the 
exchanges for high-risk employees, employers could save money and 
ensure that employees had proper coverage for a reasonable cost—at 
least in the short-term.127 
Monahan and Schwarcz found that self-insured plans could provide 
basic, preventative coverage desired by low-risk employees and exclude 
coverage for costly chronic diseases, and doing so made good economic 
sense.128  Because coverage for high-risk employees would be expensive 
on the exchange without employer subsidies (and without the low 
administrative expenses of a group health plan), Monahan and Schwarcz 
understood that employers would have to pay off these employees to 
motivate them to drop ESI.  The employer could contribute a set amount 
                                                          
 123.  Id. at 690. 
 124.  Id. at 689. 
 125.  Id. at 690–91. 
 126.  Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 88. 
 127.  Id. at 128.  Premium costs could increase or employer subsidies decline over time, making 
the cost unreasonable at a later point. 
 128.  Id. at 147–50. 
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to an HRA every year for use on the exchange.129  Monahan and 
Schwarcz were primarily worried that “employer dumping of high-risk 
employees could undermine the exchanges . . . by rendering the pool of 
policyholders seeking coverage in exchanges disproportionately risky 
relative to the general population.”130 
In his responsive article, David Hyman steps back and provides a 
broader view of why the sky is not likely to fall.131  While the employer 
risk classification that Monahan and Schwarcz explain is possible, 
Hyman argues that it is not probable (even without the recent IRS 
prohibition on using HRAs to subsidize the purchase of insurance on the 
exchanges) because of the difficulty for employers in designing such a 
system.  Employers would need to design a health plan that will attract 
low-risk employees but not high-risk employees, subsidize exchange 
coverage enough for high-risk employees to leave ESI, not face 
employee or public backlash from designing a plan with this goal in 
mind, and monitor the results—all while bringing health costs down 
enough to make this effort worthwhile.132  Hyman quotes President 
Calvin Coolidge, who said, “‘If you see ten troubles coming down the 
road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach 
you.’”133  He advocates waiting to see whether this problem runs into the 
ditch and, even if not, dealing with more urgent issues with the ACA 
first.134  As Hyman states, “When comparative institutional imperfection 
is the rule, leaving well enough alone is often sufficient unto the day.”135  
And yet the IRS chose to fill the gap in the ACA by preventing 
employers from subsidizing the employee purchase of health insurance 
on the exchanges using pre-tax funds provided through HRAs, as 
discussed below.136  That the administration saw ten troubles coming and 
                                                          
 129.  Id. at 160–62.  Because employees cannot pay for any remaining cost of insurance 
premiums with pre-tax money on the exchange, employers might have to “gross up” these 
employees to equal these extra costs, but many employees would absorb the cost simply to access 
improved insurance plans that meet their health needs.  Id. at 162–63. 
 130.  Id. at 131. 
 131.  Hyman, supra note 2. 
 132.  Id. at 89–90. 
 133.  Id. at 91. 
 134.  Id. at 91–92.  Not only does Hyman believe it will be difficult for employers to push high-
risk employees onto the exchanges, he questions why this is worse than employers instead dropping 
their health plan entirely.  Id. at 95–96. 
 135.  Id. at 105. 
 136.  See infra Part III.B.  Although the dumping strategy crafted by Monahan and Schwarcz 
does not require an HRA to succeed, it makes it easier and more likely that an employer will be able 
to selectively dump high-risk employees. 
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chose to address this one immediately is indicative of the importance 
assigned to protecting ESI. 
Much has been made about the potential for employers to selectively 
“dump” higher risk and more costly employees on the individual 
exchanges, and there remains a risk of selective dumping.  However, 
several factors incentivize employers to dump coverage of all employees 
rather than experimenting with selective dumping to achieve an optimal 
balance of employer cost and employee satisfaction.  David Hyman cites 
nondiscrimination provisions, the complexities of pricing coverage as the 
size of the pool of insureds decreases, and employee protest as factors 
pushing employers to an all or nothing calculation.137  I would add 
transaction costs associated with deciding which employees should be 
dropped and, for large corporations, the negative public reaction that 
could follow a decision to discriminate against more vulnerable 
employees. 
B. Recent HRA Guidance 
A recent newspaper headline announced I.R.S. Bars Employers From 
Dumping Workers Into Health Exchanges.138  The IRS, which along with 
the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) is responsible for implementing the ACA, has 
issued guidance prohibiting employers from providing employees with a 
pre-tax payment to use as a partial or complete subsidy for the purchase 
of health insurance through the exchanges.139 
This did not stop the discussion about whether an employer might be 
able to subsidize employees’ purchase of individual health insurance 
through the exchanges using pre-tax dollars instead of offering its own 
health plan, thus eliminating or reducing the distorting effect tax 
subsidies for ESI have on the health insurance market.  The IRS 
responded to this speculation by posting Questions and Answers (Q&As) 
to its website that repeated and emphasized that employers will face 
large penalties if they do so.140  This type of arrangement constitutes an 
“employer payment plan” as detailed in IRS Notice 2013-54 issued on 
                                                          
 137.  Hyman, supra note 16, at 14. 
 138.  Pear, supra note 88. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Employer Health Care Arrangements, supra note 92. 
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September 13, 2013.141  These employer payment plans are considered 
group health plans and are therefore subject to the ACA rules prohibiting 
annual limits for essential health benefits and cost sharing for 
preventative care.142  They cannot meet these requirements, and therefore 
such arrangements can result in excise taxes of up to $36,500 per 
employee, per year ($100 per day) under I.R.C. § 4980D.143 
HRAs are typically considered group health plans under ERISA and 
regulated as such.144  IRS Notice 2013-54 defines an employer payment 
plan as: “(1) health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs), including 
HRAs integrated with a group health plan; [and] (2) group health plans 
under which an employer reimburses an employee for some or all of the 
premium expenses incurred for an individual health insurance 
policy . . . .”145  Employer reimbursements made to the employee, or 
payments made directly to an insurance company to cover an employee’s 
premiums for health insurance not sponsored by the employer, are 
excluded from the employee’s income.146  A plan where the employer 
offers an employee cash or after-tax money applicable to health 
insurance is not considered an employer payment plan. 
The ACA amended the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) in two 
respects relevant here.147  Section 2711 of the PHSA prohibits a group 
health plan (which, as discussed above, includes HRAs) or an insurer 
offering group health insurance from setting an annual limit on the 
amount of benefits for an individual.148  This prohibition only applies to 
                                                          
 141.  Id.  DOL issued the corresponding Technical Release 2013-03, and HHS will soon issue 
similar guidance.  On January 24, 2013, DOL and HHS also issued FAQs providing guidance on the 
effect of the Affordable Care Act on HRAs.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287.  “The term ‘group health plan’ means an 
employee welfare benefit plan to the extent that the plan provides medical care . . . to employees or 
their dependents (as defined under the terms of the plan) directly or through insurance, 
reimbursements, or otherwise.”  ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 733, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1191b (2012)). 
 145.  I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, at 1, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287, 287. 
 146.  Id. at 2; see I.R.C. § 106 (2012). 
 147.  Section 1001 of the ACA added PHSA §§ 2711–2719.  PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 
1001, §§ 2711–2719, 124 Stat. 119, 131–38 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-11 
to -19 (2012)).  These market reforms are interpreted by the IRS, DOL, and HHS. 
 148.  Section 2711 of the PHSA provides:  
(a) Prohibition 
(1) In general 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health 
insurance coverage may not establish— 
(A) lifetime limits on the dollar value of benefits for any participant or beneficiary; 
or  
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“essential health benefits” and not other benefits covered under the 
plan.149  Section 2713 of the PHSA requires non-grandfathered group 
health plans or insurers offering group health insurance to cover some 
preventive services without any cost sharing.150 
                                                          
 
(B) except as provided in paragraph (2), annual limits on the dollar value of benefits 
for any participant or beneficiary. . . 
(b) Per beneficiary limits 
Subsection (a) shall not be construed to prevent a group health plan or health insurance 
coverage from placing annual or lifetime per beneficiary limits on specific covered 
benefits that are not essential health benefits under section 1302(b) of [the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act], to the extent that such limits are otherwise 
permitted under Federal or State law. 
PPACA sec. 1001, § 2711. 
 149.  The ACA defines essential health benefits as follows:  
(1) In general.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary shall define the essential health 
benefits, except that such benefits shall include at least the following general categories 
and the items and services covered within the categories: 
  (A) Ambulatory patient services. 
  (B) Emergency services. 
  (C) Hospitalization. 
  (D) Maternity and newborn care. 
  (E) Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health 
treatment. 
  (F) Prescription drugs. 
  (G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices. 
  (H) Laboratory services. 
  (I) Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management. 
  (J) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care. 
(2) Limitation.— 
  (A) In general.—The Secretary shall ensure that the scope of the essential health 
benefits under paragraph (1) is equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical 
employer plan, as determined by the Secretary.  To inform this determination, the 
Secretary of Labor shall conduct a survey of employer-sponsored coverage to determine 
the benefits typically covered by employers, including multiemployer plans, and provide 
a report on such survey to the Secretary. 
PPACA § 1302(b). 
 150.  Section 2713 of the PHSA provides:  
(a) In General.—A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall 
not impose any cost sharing requirements for— 
  (1) evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of ‘A’ or ‘B’ in the 
current recommendations of the United States Preventing Services Task Force;  
  (2) immunizations that have in effect a recommendation from the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
with respect to the individual involved; and  
  (3) with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, evidence-informed preventive 
care and screenings provided for in the comprehensive guidelines supported by the 
Health Resources and Services Administration.  
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Previous guidance indicated that an employer payment plan would 
fail to meet the annual dollar limit prohibition.  The interim final 
regulations on the prohibition state that if an HRA is integrated with 
other health coverage that would itself comply with the annual dollar 
limit prohibition, the HRA does not fail to comply with the prohibition 
simply because it does not meet the requirement on its own—the 
combined arrangement qualifies.151  Frequently Asked Questions issued 
by the IRS, DOL, and HHS on January 24, 2013 provided that an HRA is 
not integrated with primary health coverage offered by the employer 
unless the HRA is offered only to employees covered by employer-
sponsored primary insurance (meaning ESI).152 
More technically, the IRS will not allow an employer-provided HRA 
to be integrated with individual health insurance policies purchased on 
the exchanges, and the HRA will therefore fail to meet the annual dollar 
limit prohibition.  For an HRA to be considered integrated with 
employer-sponsored primary insurance that meets the requirements, the 
employee must actually be enrolled in such primary coverage through the 
employer.153  IRS Notice 2013-54 provides further guidance in the form 
of Q&As.  It clarifies that any group health plan (including an HRA) 
used to purchase health insurance on the individual market is not 
integrated with that individual market plan and therefore violates the 
annual dollar limit prohibition—“an employer payment plan is 
considered to impose an annual limit up to the cost of the individual 
market coverage purchased through the arrangement . . . .”154 
Similar to the analysis for the annual dollar limit prohibition, a group 
health plan (including an HRA) that is used to purchase primary health 
coverage on the individual market is not integrated with that coverage 
under the ACA’s preventive services provision.  Since “an employer 
payment plan does not provide preventive services without cost-sharing 
                                                          
 
  (4) with respect to women, such additional preventing care and screenings not 
described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the 
Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.  
  (5) for the purposes of this Act, and for the purposes of any other provision of law, the 
current recommendations of the United States Preventive Service Task Force regarding 
breast cancer screening, mammography, and preventing shall be considered the most 
current other than those issued in or around November 2009. 
PPACA sec. 1001, § 2713. 
 151.  IRS Notice 2013-54, at 4, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287, 290. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 6, 289. 
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in all instances,” the arrangement fails to meet the preventive services 
requirement.155 
At its heart, the guidance states that because HRAs are not 
considered integrated with individual health insurance plans purchased 
on the exchanges, employers cannot use the accounts to meet the ACA 
employer mandate by subsidizing the purchase of health insurance not 
sponsored by the employers.  In effect, the guidance limits most 
employees to the group health plan or plans selected by their employers 
(assuming these employers offer health benefits).  This is because tax 
subsidies offered for ESI decrease its cost to employees and make it 
unlikely that they will purchase insurance in the exchanges without 
offsetting employer subsidies or government tax incentives.156 
While the use of individual account plans in health financing has 
drawbacks, as discussed below,157 I am more concerned about an 
impediment to their growth that results in further stratification of the 
health insurance market between the “haves” (those with ESI) and the 
“have nots” (those without).  If used to convey employer subsidies for 
the purchase of insurance on the exchanges, these plans will increase 
meaningful choice among health benefits and coverage.  In the process, 
they will move more middle and high-income workers into the 
exchanges, making them more robust and decreasing any lingering 
stigma from the lack of ESI. 
I see individual accounts as a tool to increase participation in the 
exchanges created by the ACA.  This will result in greater choice for 
everyone as commercial insurers increase offerings and allow the 
wealthier, healthier workers pushed onto the exchanges to help subsidize 
the others, as any successful insurance system requires. 
IV. THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM 
While employees have had a longstanding attachment to their ESI, 
they have in recent years seen a complete transformation of their 
employee benefits brought about by the shift to defined contribution, or 
individual account, plans providing retirement income, college savings, 
and, increasingly, health financing.  These accounts have allowed 
employees to customize their benefits in ways not previously available.  
Furthermore, employees value the freedom of choice and the possibility 
                                                          
 155.  Id.  
 156.  See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the incentives for low-income employees to purchase 
insurance in the exchanges under the ACA). 
 157.  See infra Part IV.A (describing the establishment of the defined contribution paradigm). 
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that if their investments are fruitful or they curtail their spending through 
the accounts, then they can reap the rewards in greater funds available 
for retirement or lower medical expenses. 
In the decades following the passage of ERISA, employers largely 
shifted from offering defined benefit pension plans, which provide an 
employer-funded, fixed sum paid at regular intervals to employees only 
after retirement, to defined contribution plans, which provide employees 
with an individual account funded by both employers (at times and in 
fluctuating amounts) and employees.  Unlike with defined benefit plans, 
employees with defined contribution plans own and control funds 
immediately and can access them in times of financial hardship prior to 
retirement or receive them in a lump sum at that point.158  Much has been 
made by scholars of the resulting shift in risk from employers to 
employees.159  With defined benefit plans, the employer bears most of 
the risk because it is obligated to pay a fixed sum to the retiree for as 
long as he lives, regardless of poor investment results for the money that 
the employer has set aside to fund the annuity-type payments or the 
unexpected longevity of the retiree and resulting increase in the number 
of payments.  With defined contribution plans, however, the employer 
makes a one-time payment (and the amount can change based on 
business performance or the employer’s whims) and has no subsequent 
obligation to the employee.  Yet employees, in spite of the risk shift, 
have become attached to their individual accounts, in large part because 
they fit with the American narrative of individual choice and 
ownership.160 
                                                          
 158.  See WOOTEN, supra note 8, at 271–72 (noting how since ERISA, defined contribution 
plans (especially 401(k) plans) have become the “primary retirement savings vehicle for private-
sector workers . . . [which] may be changing the function of the private pension system”). 
 159.  See HACKER, supra note 24, at 112–13 (arguing that even though investment returns for 
defined benefit plans only narrowly exceeded those for defined contribution plans in a study, “the 
central issue for retirement security isn’t the return, but the risk” since defined benefit plans “forced 
savings,” were managed by investment professionals, and pooled risks across workers); EDWARD A. 
ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 5–30 (2007) (analyzing the proper allocation of retirement-related 
risks, which he categorizes as investment risk, funding risk, and longevity risk, and reward between 
employers and employees and finding that concerns over the shift in risk to employees are missing 
the “appeal” of individual accounts). 
 160.  See ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at 100 (Account holders “must earn income and then save it 
through salary reduction or other kinds of contributions to obtain what is conventionally thought to 
be public support in the form of tax subsidies for these accounts . . . [reconciling] public subvention 
and private ownership in a particularly American and historically precedented fashion.”); cf. 
Suzanne Cosgrove, More Choices; Company Health-care Plans Let Workers Tailor Insurance 
Coverage, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 2005, at 5 (“‘Freedom of choice’ among health-care providers, ‘that’s 
what has fueled the market’ and its changes in recent years.” (quoting Joel Shalowitz, director of the 
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The defined contribution revolution then expanded to health 
financing.  As discussed below, flexible savings accounts (FSAs), 
medical savings accounts (MSAs), health reimbursement arrangements 
(HRAs), and health savings accounts (HSAs) all developed and 
collectively grew in popularity.161  Employees gained the freedom of 
choice—the ability to customize their package of employer-sponsored 
health benefits—to some extent.162  Although employees were still 
limited to the offerings of employers within the cafeteria plans, they 
could theoretically choose from an increasing array of group health plans 
with varying levels of coverage and related tax-preferred individual 
accounts for reducing the cost of deductibles, co-payments, and co-
insurance or even covering routine expenses until high-deductible health 
plans kicked in at the designated threshold.  Along with the freedom and 
customization provided by the new “ownership society,”163 however, 
came the incentive to participate in managing and containing health 
expenses.164 
Yet the advance of defined contribution plans for financing 
healthcare may have hit a wall with the recent IRS guidance that 
penalizes employers that use pre-tax funds to subsidize the purchase of 
health insurance by employees on the new exchanges like they do to 
subsidize the purchase of health insurance by employees through the 
employer.  Not only does this show the exceptionalism of health among 
employee benefits, but it also shows how the ongoing fight to preserve 
ESI in its current form is impeding the so-called shift to consumer-driven 
health plans in health financing. 
                                                          
 
health industry management program at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of 
Management)). 
 161.  See ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at 58–64, 81–84 (giving background on extension of 
defined contribution revolution). 
 162.  See Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
485, 499–500 (2004) (suggesting that “consumer-choice plans” are desirable to participants and may 
influence health policy, but “merely offering a choice of plans does not guarantee significantly lower 
costs, better quality or patient satisfaction”); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 
2751, 2799 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the decisions whether to claim benefits 
under the plans are made not by Hobby Lobby or Conestoga, but by the covered employees and 
dependents, in consultation with their health care providers”). 
 163.  ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at xiii. 
 164.  See Mariner, supra note 162, at 504–05 (arguing that individual account plans require 
employees to decide how much to spend on healthcare and what type of care to purchase as well as 
to deal with the repercussions of errors in judgment); see also BEATRIX HOFFMAN, HEALTH CARE 
FOR SOME: RIGHTS AND RATIONING IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1930 195 (2012) (explaining that 
President Bush focused on forcing consumers to control medical costs with tools such as higher 
deductibles).  Co-payments, co-insurance, and higher deductibles all help place the onus of cost 
containment on workers. 
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Beginning in 2017, the ACA will allow states to permit all 
employers to participate in the exchanges, and employers could then use 
cafeteria plans to allow employees to use pre-tax funds to purchase their 
insurance on the exchanges.165  I argue, however, that if the Obama 
administration refused to allow such a defined contribution model of 
health insurance, it is likely that the states will follow suit.  The same 
pressures based on historical attachment to ESI that caused the IRS to 
issue its recent HRA guidance will prevent the states from taking 
advantage of this opportunity under the ACA.  A reversal of the federal 
policy on HRAs, however, would open the door for the states to 
implement a defined contribution model of health financing and devalue 
ESI. 
A. Establishment of the Defined Contribution Paradigm 
Beginning with the shift to defined contribution pension plans 
(including individual retirement accounts or “IRAs” and 401(k)s)166 and 
moving into new vehicles to finance healthcare expenses, Americans 
have increasingly been exposed to tax-favored individual accounts that 
allow them to own and control their social welfare benefits.167  With 
advantages for employees that include the freedom to customize benefits 
used to finance their retirement income, health, and education needs, 
Americans have expressed satisfaction with these new forms of welfare 
spending.  Employers too have supported the movement to a defined 
contribution paradigm, though as much in a search for a cost-
                                                          
 165.  PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1515(a), 124 Stat. 119, 258 (2010) (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 125(f) (2012)).  Section 1312(f)(2)(B) of the ACA also provides that:  
(i) In general.—Beginning in 2017, each State may allow issuers of health insurance 
coverage in the large group market in the State to offer qualified health plans in such 
market through an Exchange.  Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed as 
requiring the issuer to offer such plans through an Exchange.   
(ii) Large employers eligible.—If a State under clause (i) allows issuers to offer qualified 
health plans in the large group market through an Exchange, the term “qualified 
employer” shall include a large employer that elects to make all full-time employees of 
such employer eligible for 1 or more qualified health plans offered in the large group 
market through the exchange. 
PPACA § 1312(f)(2)(B) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(2)(B)(2012)). 
 166.  An IRA is a trust or custodial account, established for the exclusive benefit of an individual 
or his or her beneficiaries, by an individual, employer, or by an employee association.  I.R.C. § 408-
2(a)–(b) (2012).  A 401(k) is a trust that allows an employee to defer the receipt of compensation in 
exchange for tax-free contributions to the trust.  Id. §§ 401(k)-1(3)(B), 401(k)-1(4)(iii). 
 167.  See Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Susannah Camic, Tax Credits for Health Insurance, 37 J. L. 
MED. & ETHICS 73, 75 (2009) (“[H]ealth insurance coverage and the tax system have been deeply 
entangled for more than half a century.  This co-dependence has been expanded substantially during 
the past several decades with an exponential growth in complexity.”). 
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containment measure as an arrangement that employees value.  Before 
evaluating the positive and negative aspects of the defined contribution 
revolution,168 I will briefly relay the historical shift to individual accounts 
in employee benefits and particularly how these accounts have changed 
employees’ experience with financing their healthcare costs. 
The defined contribution paradigm has its roots in the shift by 
employers from sponsoring defined benefit pension plans to instead (or 
at times, in addition) sponsoring defined contribution pension plans.  For 
years, scholars focused on pensions and mourned the loss of many 
defined benefit pension plans, which provide employees with regular 
fixed payments made during retirement typically based on salary and 
years worked for the employer.169  Caused by the decline of unions and 
changing worker expectations and accelerated by the new mandates 
ERISA placed on defined benefit plans, employers swiftly shifted to 
defined contribution pension plans.  Under defined contribution plans, 
employers provide employees only with a set contribution, typically a 
percentage of salary, and then leave it to employees to make investment 
selections and bear the risk of poor performance on the markets.  An 
employee receives a lump sum at retirement and is then free to use the 
money as he sees fit. 
Assuming an equivalent employer contribution to either a defined 
benefit or defined contribution plan (although employers typically reduce 
contributions when the shift to defined contribution plans occurs), the 
                                                          
 168.  Employees, intoxicated with the idea of owning and controlling their retirement funds 
immediately ushered in an era of defined contribution accounts in social welfare benefits.  See 
ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at xiii (“In its own way, the emergence of the defined contribution 
paradigm has been a revolution, a revolution without a mastermind and without a cataclysmic event, 
but a revolution nonetheless which has, step-by-step, without fanfare, cumulatively transformed tax 
and social policy in fundamental ways.”); see also Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of 
Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 778 (2006) (“The ownership society 
generally refers to a society in which individual ownership of assets is encouraged and where 
individuals are ‘in control of their own lives and destinies’ and not dependent on handouts.”). 
 169.  See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-
Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 987 (2007) 
(“The shrinking minority who are covered by a defined benefit pension plan are seeing their 
employers increasingly renege on pension plan commitments.  The growing minority offered an 
employer-sponsored defined contribution plan are seeing their potential nest eggs diluted by inertia, 
job-change leakages, and an over-concentration in company stock.”); Janice Kay McClendon, The 
Death Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans: Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80 TEMP. 
L. REV. 809, 813 (2007) (“With the abandonment of defined benefit plans, employees are left with 
defined contribution plan coverage that provides minimal benefit accruals during working years and 
no fixed benefit in postretirement years.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution 
Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 533–34 (2004) (“However, the movement from the defined benefit 
framework to the defined contribution paradigm will, in the long run, prove problematic for some, 
perhaps many, employees by shifting from their employers to them the investment, funding, and 
longevity risks associated with retirement savings.”). 
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tradeoff an employee faces is between risk and choice.  Under defined 
benefit pension plans, employees cannot decide how the money that will 
fund their pensions is invested.  This is because even though they have 
entitlements to the benefits once vested, they do not own or have 
possession of the funds until they are taken from the joint trust account 
and paid out, typically as annuities during retirement.  Defined 
contribution plans, however, allow employees to see the money in their 
individual accounts, decide how to invest it (as most plans now allow),170 
and access the money at any point after retirement (and frequently while 
working with the increasing practice of dipping into such plans for loans 
during working years). 
As a result of increasing employee familiarity with defined 
contribution pensions and employer incentives to reduce premiums for 
their group health plans,171 defined contribution (or individual account) 
arrangements also became a fixture in healthcare financing.  In the 
1980s, the flexible spending account (FSA) was introduced.  Through 
IRC Section 125, Congress allowed employees to choose to receive 
either taxable income or “purchase” fringe benefits through a “cafeteria 
plan” using pre-tax funds.172  Employees increasingly used FSAs to 
reduce the cost of co-payments, deductibles, and co-insurance associated 
with their health insurance plans.173  One notable feature of FSAs is that 
account holders forfeit any remaining balance if it is not used for medical 
                                                          
 170.  See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 404(c)(1)(A), 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2012)). 
 171.  None of this implies that defined benefit plans are extinct in this country.  In the public 
sector, they are very much alive—although they are suffering from serious ailments as a result of 
state and municipal budget shortfalls and political arguments that they are too costly and too 
generous compared to private sector pension benefits.  See ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at 78–81, 140 
(“It is no surprise that public employment is the last bastion of traditional defined benefit pensions 
since public employment is also the last bastion of unionism.”).  Indeed, many companies still 
sponsor defined benefit pension plans.  Id. at 31 (“Almost three-quarters (3/4) of the companies 
listed in the S&P 500 sponsor defined benefit plans.”).  Employers continue to slowly shift 
employees to defined contribution plans, and the remaining defined benefit plans frequently use cash 
balance accounts that give employees the feeling of individual ownership.  Id. at 31–32 (describing 
the decrease in both the number of defined benefit plans and the number of participants and noting 
that the remaining plans have largely “switched to the cash balance configuration which mimics the 
individual account paradigm”).  401(k) plans and IRAs flourish.  Id. at 32 (approximately 40% of 
private sector employees participate in defined contribution plans, which is double the rate of 
participation in defined benefit plans). 
 172.  ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at 59 (“The FSA thus further acclimated working Americans to 
the individual account experience, broadening that experience beyond retirement savings.”).  See 
Daniel C. Schaffer & Daniel M. Fox, Tax Law as Health Policy: A History of Cafeteria Plans 1978-
1985, 8 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 1, 56 (1989) (chronicling legislative history of Section 125 and 
concluding that “health policy, and indeed any social policy made through tax law is likely to be 
badly made”). 
 173.  ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at 59. 
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expenses incurred by the end of the year—causing some to make 
qualified purchases that may not be necessary if they risk otherwise 
losing the funds.174 
The medical savings account (MSA), modeled on the IRA, took the 
defined contribution revolution in healthcare financing further.  
Established in the IRC by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996,175 an individual with an MSA makes tax-
deductible contributions to the account that grow and are applied (still 
tax-free) to pay for medical expenses for the account owner and his 
family.  Only the self-employed and employees of small employers with 
fifty employees or less were eligible to establish an MSA, and they had 
to be used in combination with “high deductible” medical insurance to 
protect against large medical expenses.  No new MSAs could be 
established after December 31, 2007, unless an employer already had a 
program, but the MSAs led to other health financing accounts.176 
As the shift to the defined contribution paradigm continued, 
insurance companies adapted the MSA to lobby the IRS for the health 
reimbursement arrangement (HRA), added to the IRC in 2001.177  An 
HRA is an employer-funded vehicle for reimbursing employee medical 
care expenses.178  Similar to the MSA, these individual accounts 
reimburse routine medical expenses up to a level chosen by the employer 
and then traditional health insurance takes over payment for expenses 
once the HRA runs dry.179  If an employer self-insures, all health 
coverage can be reimbursed through the HRA, but this is less 
common.180  The HRA can reimburse medical expenses for the 
employee, his or her spouse, and dependents (including children up to 
                                                          
 174.  Barry Kozak, New Health Savings Accounts Promote Consumer Driven Health Care, 18 
CBA REC. 58, 58 (2004). 
 175.  A medical savings account, or Archer MSA, is a trust that is coupled with a high-deductible 
health plan and created exclusively for the purpose of paying medical expenses.  Withdrawals from 
the account are tax-free, as long as they are used to pay for the medical care of the account holder, 
the account holder’s spouse, or a dependent.  I.R.C. §§ 220(c)(1)(A), 220(d)(1), 220(d)(2)(A), 220(f) 
(2012); HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, sec. 301(a), § 220, 110 Stat. 1936, 2037 (1996). 
 176.  ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at 60–61. 
 177.  HRAs reimburse qualified medical expenses.  See I.R.C. § 213(d).  They must comply with 
Sections 105 and 106 of the Code.  See id. §§ 105, 106. 
 178.  I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287; see I.R.C. § 213(d). 
 179.  I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287. 
 180.  ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at 81–82; see also I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93; 
Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-28 I.R.B. 75. 
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age 27) up to the maximum allowance.181  The reimbursements are not 
taxable.182 
In 2003, the advent of the health savings account (HSA) expanded 
the reach of individual accounts in healthcare and removed many of the 
restrictions.183  HSAs are a method of financing healthcare that includes 
both tax-favored contributions made to an individual account and a high-
deductible health plan (HDHP).184  Employees bear the full cost of any 
health expenses paid after the account runs dry and before the threshold 
triggering the HDHP is met.185  Any individual with a high-deductible 
health plan as their only health insurance or plan may make tax-
deductible contributions to an HSA.186  An HDHP is a plan with a 
minimum annual deductible in 2014 of $1,250 for a single person and 
$2,500 for a family with a maximum annual deductible of $6,350 for a 
single person and $12,000 for a family.187  The individual owner of the 
account can contribute to $3,300 in 2014 if single and $6,550 on behalf 
of a family.188  Like the MSA, contributions to the HSA are tax-free, 
funds grow tax-free, and distributions are tax-free if used for eligible 
expenses.189 
                                                          
 181.  I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Former President George W. Bush touted the benefits of HSAs heavily: “‘Health savings 
accounts all aim at empowering people to make decisions for themselves, owning their own health 
care plan, and at the same time bringing some demand control into the cost of [health] care . . . .’”  
Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Promotes Health Savings Accounts; He Says Plan Would Cut Insurance 
Costs and Increase Patient Responsibility, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2005, at A02.  In the first three 
years after the advent of the health savings account, approximately three million individuals opened 
HSAs.  Jim VandeHei, In Ohio, Bush Touts Health Savings Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/15/AR2006021502296.html.  By 
2013, over 8 million individuals had HSAs.  Michelle Park Lazette, Health Savings Accounts Rising 
at Healthy Rate, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS., (June 26, 2013, 9:13 AM), http://www.crains 
cleveland.com/article/20130623/SUB1/306249988/health-savings-accounts-rising-at-healthy-rate.  
While MSAs were limited to self-employed or small employers (with 50 or fewer employees), 
individuals are eligible for HSAs as long as they are enrolled in a high-deductible health plan.  I.R.C. 
§§ 220(c)(4)(A), 223(c)(1).  For HSAs, such high-deductible health plans have a lower minimum 
deductible threshold ($1,000 for individuals) than MSAs ($1,500 for individuals).  Id. §§ 
220(c)(2)(A), 223(c)(2)(A).  Unlike MSAs, HSAs also allowed both the individual and the employer 
to contribute to the savings account.  See id. § 220(c)(1)(A) (limiting eligibility to those whose 
accounts are established and maintained by the employer or the individual, but not both); id. § 
223(c)(1) (defining as eligible any individual with a high-deductible health plan who is not also 
covered under another health plan). 
 184.  Monahan, supra note 168. 
 185.  Id. at 780. 
 186.  I.R.C. § 223(c)(1). 
 187.  Rev. Proc. 13-25, 2013-21 I.R.B. 1110. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at 83–84. 
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The enrollment of plans combining individual accounts such as 
HRAs and HSAs with high-deductible health plans has increased 
dramatically in recent years.190  In 2011, 17% of workers with ESI were 
enrolled in such a plan.191  Although more firms offered HDHPs in 
conjunction with HSAs (18%) instead of HRAs (7%), enrollment was 
roughly equal between the types of plans (9% in HDHPs with HSAs and 
8% in HDHPs with HRAs).192  HRAs are less restrictive in the types of 
HDHPs that can be combined with the accounts and allow employers to 
keep any remaining funds if an employee leaves the plan or the job.193 
Defined contribution health plans such as MSAs, FSAs, HRAs, and 
HSAs have also been called consumer-driven health plans.194  This 
movement purported to put more power in the hands of consumers to 
design their medical benefits and choose their physicians than had been 
the case in the managed care era.195  Some have questioned the ability of 
workers to make rational decisions when it comes to choosing their 
medical plan and utilizing the funds in these accounts.196  The ability of 
workers to make effective decisions about their own medical needs and 
financing, however, is at the heart of the movement for choice in this 
area.197  This Article’s discussion of bounded rationality with respect to 
ESI does not imply that individuals can never make rational decisions 
about health insurance purchases.  Instead, it signifies only that they are 
not making rational decisions under the current system of ESI.  Without 
the distorting effects of tax subsidies and historical ties of health 
                                                          
 190.  M. Kate Bundorft, Consumer-Directed Health Plans: Do They Deliver?, in THE SYNTHESIS 
PROJECT, at 1 (Robert Wood Johnson Found., Res. Synthesis Rep. No. 24, 2012), 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2012/rwjf402405 (finding that CDHP 
enrollees are wealthier and have higher levels of education, and healthcare spending declines from 
5% to 14% with enrollment). 
 191.  Id. at 5. 
 192.  Id. at 5–6. 
 193.  Id. at 5, 9, 18. 
 194.  See Amy B. Monahan, Employers as Risks, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 765–66 (2014); 
Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 
119–20 (2005) (“Lacking a single definition, the phrase [consumer-driven health care] has come to 
refer generally to health plans that give employees both greater responsibility for designing their 
own benefit packages and choosing their providers . . . as well as greater financial risk for their 
health-care costs.”); see also Russell B. Cate, Note, Move over Managed Care—Health Savings 
Accounts, Small Businesses, and Low Wage Earners, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 287, 294–95 (2007). 
 195.  See Crossley, supra note 194, at 118–21. 
 196.  See id. at 129–31 (noting fears that consumers lack necessary information to make medical 
decisions, are unduly influenced by physicians, and will be forced to make decisions in times of 
great stress due to health crises). 
 197.  See id. at 131 (“Regardless of one’s level of optimism regarding patients’ competency to 
make cost-effective medical decisions, however, this competency is indisputably a central premise of 
consumerism.  Without it, patients’ decisions may be as likely to harm as to promote their health.”). 
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insurance to employment, and with additional education on available 
health plans and experience gained in the exchanges, there is reason to 
believe that decision making will improve even if it remains imperfect. 
Aside from the ethos of choice inherent in individual account plans, 
these arrangements have taken hold in health as a cost-containment 
measure.  Unless employees can save money directly by limiting their 
medical care, they will not have an incentive to reduce healthcare 
expenses.198  Employees are most likely to save by reducing their 
preventative care and discretionary expenses for minor illnesses.199  But 
employees with individual account plans typically pay more for their 
health expenses than those with a health plan through their employer that 
does not include an individual account.  Thus, the use of defined 
contribution plans in healthcare shifts the financial risk to employees for 
their medical expenses in a similar way that the movement to defined 
contribution pension plans shifted the financial risk for retirement 
expenses to employees.200 
B. Devaluing ESI through HRAs 
Edward Zelinsky’s prediction for the future was that “in the private 
sector, the defined contribution model for retirement, health care and 
educational savings is entrenched and will continue to expand with little 
resistance.”201  His prediction, however, misses some of the nuances of 
health insurance and financing.  He begins with a basic analogy of 
defined benefit pension plans to health insurance: 
Medical insurance . . . is the health care analogue to a defined 
benefit pension.  Just as defined benefit plans pool employees 
and their claims and assign risk and reward to the sponsoring 
employer, medical insurance pools the insureds into a covered 
group and allocates risk and reward to the insurer.  If those 
                                                          
 198.  See Monahan, supra note 194, at 765–66. 
 199.  Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 
CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 211 (2008) (“Shifting this kind of care out of the defined benefit package trims 
health plans of their coverage of some non-fortuitous risks . . . .”). 
 200.  Monahan, supra note 194, at 756; Crossley, supra note 194, at 119–20 (“While promising 
consumers a broader choice of providers and greater control over their medical decisions, consumer-
driven plans promise employers cost savings flowing from the combination of greater efficiency in 
the purchasing decisions of cost-conscious consumers and a shifting of health-care costs to 
employees.”). 
 201.  ZELINSKY, supra note 159, at xvi.  “Equally disputatious will be the debate about efforts to 
expands [sic] the use of HSAs, a debate which addresses the fundamental implications of the defined 
contribution paradigm: the merits of individual ownership and control, the benefits of risk-pooling, 
the costs of adverse selection, the distributional consequences of individual accounts.”  Id. at 137. 
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covered by medical insurance in the aggregate spend less on 
medical care than had been predicted, the difference inures to the 
insurer; conversely, greater than expected outlays for the insured 
group are the insurer’s problem.  Similarly, if the insurer 
generates more income than anticipated from the investment of 
premiums, that profit accrues to the insurer—as does poorer than 
expected investment experience.  Within the group of insureds, 
insurance pools the risks of unexpectedly bad health just as 
defined benefit plans pool investment, funding and longevity 
risks for members of the covered workforce.202 
The main difference between the defined contribution revolution in 
pension plans and the rise of individual accounts for health financing, 
however, is that the element of choice is curtailed with health accounts.  
In the area of pensions, employers gave employees both ownership of the 
funds and the ability to customize their retirement benefits.  Employees 
with individual accounts to subsidize their medical costs, however, still 
typically have the choice of one or a small number of health plans that 
determine what types of health conditions will be paid for by insurance 
and what types will be the employees’ responsibility—tax-subsidized 
though that responsibility may be.203  Employees do not have control 
over deductibles, co-insurance and co-payments with little chance of 
customizing either the benefits covered or the extent to which they are 
covered by insurance.204  Employees have ownership of the funds here, 
but no meaningful choice as to how they will be spent, and “[t]he locus 
of key decision-making is the central issue in health policy.”205  As Amy 
Monahan writes, the plan design that employees do not control 
determines their financial (and health) risk.206 
The opportunity for employers to subsidize the purchase of health 
insurance on the exchanges by employees was the first opportunity for 
                                                          
 202.  Id. at 61–62 (citations omitted). 
 203.  Although anyone can utilize an HDHP in combination with an HSA, typically employees 
utilize the plans made available through their employers if there are any.  The more common use of 
an FSA with a traditional group health plan allows employees a small number of plans to choose 
from and they are pre-selected by employers. 
 204.  Monahan, supra note 194, at 766.  The difference between 401(k) plans and group health 
plans offered by an employer is that 401(k) plans allow employees to customize their retirement 
savings strategy, but employer health plans do not allow for individual choice.  Id. at 768–70. 
 205.  Moffit, supra note 85, at 560, 568 (argues against further consolidation of healthcare 
financing and regulation and in favor of defined-contribution financing with enhanced “personal 
choice in health coverage” by individuals). 
 206.  Monahan, supra note 194, at 768–70 (“However, 82% of firms that offer health benefits 
offer employees only a single plan, although over half of all workers have a choice of health plans.  
This results in a sizeable portion of the employee population having only a single ‘take it or leave it’ 
health plan option, and increases the likelihood that some employees will continue to face health-
insurance related risks even if they have coverage.”). 
678 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
defined contribution accounts in health financing to provide choice.  
Assuming there are meaningful differences between the plans offered on 
the exchanges, employees would for the first time have full control over 
benefits covered and levels of coverage.  Although some have argued 
that employers make better decisions when designing or purchasing 
group health insurance than individual employees would,207 that is a 
concern equally valid in the pension context where individuals are now 
free to make whatever potentially foolish investment and spending 
decisions they wish. 
Portability is another way in which subsidizing the purchase of 
employee health insurance on the exchanges would make defined 
contribution plans in health financing more like pensions.  The recent 
IRS guidance does nothing to deal with worker mobility.208  ESI locks 
employees into jobs because a new employer may not offer any (heavily 
tax-subsidized) coverage at all or may offer less favorable coverage.209  
Having an individual market as an alternative is helpful and may 
convince some employees with less generous health plans to move, but 
continuing attachment to ESI still locks employees into jobs.  Although 
employees would still risk losing valuable employer subsidies for health 
insurance if employers are allowed to subsidize the purchase of insurance 
on the exchanges and employees leave employment, they will not lose 
their insurance plans.  Instead, employees can then make an informed 
decision about how total compensation packages compare.  An 
employer’s contribution to an employee’s health insurance premiums 
will be just one, easily quantified factor in switching jobs.  Regardless, 
fear of change with respect to their health insurance will no longer tie 
employees to employers. 
While the problems with consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs) are 
well catalogued,210 the administration’s recent roadblock in the path of 
defined contribution plans in health financing is important for several 
reasons.  First, it demonstrates the shift in policy from the Bush 
administration in this area.  One could endlessly debate whether these 
                                                          
 207.  See Monahan, supra note 168, at 818–30. 
 208.  See id. at 807–09 (discussing limitation on worker mobility presented by HSAs and 
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 209.  See id. 
 210.  See id. (cataloguing problems with CDHPs such as adverse selection as the healthy flee to 
CDHPs and leave other insurance products with poor risk pools and possible poor decision making 
by consumers with respect to health expenses resulting in financial losses); see also Crossley, supra 
note 194, at 131–32 (arguing that HSAs, and other “consumerist mechanisms” shift risk for 
uninsured medical expenses to consumers and may thus disadvantage the unhealthy or those with 
low incomes as they are forced to ration their healthcare). 
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individual account plans actually do expand consumer choice or if 
blocking the use of these plans in this instance preserves consumer 
choice in favor of ESI (although this choice is of course artificially 
preserved by tax subsidies).  Preventing workers from purchasing health 
insurance on a thriving exchange, however, would undoubtedly limit the 
types of coverage available to those workers.  Though employers have 
acted as a useful intermediary, evaluating many health plan designs 
before winnowing the options for employees, they have different goals 
when choosing health plans than employees.  Individual healthcare needs 
vary, and so health plans selections should vary accordingly. 
Second, this action to prevent workers from using employer 
subsidies to purchase insurance outside employment through individual 
accounts hurts individuals on the exchanges.  Since employees covered 
by ESI and kept segregated from the exchanges through this guidance are 
likely to be, on average, wealthier, there is now socioeconomic 
segmentation of the health insurance market.  Some would argue that this 
differentiation has existed for decades as some have ESI and some do 
not, and the ACA has only improved conditions for those who lack ESI 
through the exchanges.  Even so, why not use the opportunity to reduce 
inequality here?  It will only help eliminate the second-class status of 
those who lack ESI and create more robust exchanges in the long run.  
Putting aside my feelings about the much-maligned consumer-driven 
health movement, I see here an opportunity to increase choice and 
equality in health insurance in the long-term—an opportunity the Obama 
administration has missed. 
The ACA amended the IRC to prevent employers from offering 
employees pre-tax funds to use to purchase health plans on the 
exchanges.211  An exception was made for small employers eligible to 
purchase insurance for their employees on the exchanges.212  Beginning 
in 2017, each state can allow those who issue group health plans to sell 
them on an exchange and large employers to purchase those plans 
through the exchange.213  All employers would then have the option of 
using cafeteria plans to offer employees pre-tax funds to purchase health 
insurance on that exchange.214 
While this would advance the use of defined contribution health 
financing, it is unlikely that many states will allow large employers to 
                                                          
 211.  PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1515(a), 124 Stat. 119, 258 (2010) (codified as amended 
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follow this path when the federal government has not.  States will be 
subject to the same political pressures to maintain the current ESI 
system.  If the Obama administration could not withstand the pressure, 
then it is unlikely that individual states will do so.  The revocation of the 
HRA guidance would be the first step to an ongoing experiment with 
health financing and defined contribution plans.  More importantly, it 
would take us one more step away from ESI. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ACA is focused on individual choice—as long as that choice is 
ESI.215  The attachment that employees have to ESI is considered to be so 
important that the Obama administration continues to build protections 
for ESI into the statute.  These protections ignore the facts that: (1) some 
employees (particularly low-income workers or those with particular 
health conditions or coverage preferences) would prefer to instead 
purchase insurance on the exchanges; and (2) it is likely that the majority 
of employees would be better off in the long-run if the border between 
ESI and the exchanges was more porous. 
The recent HRA guidance prevents a potentially useful innovation in 
our public-private system of health benefits.  Defined contribution plans 
have been touted for the choice that they permit employees, although 
critics have focused on the insurance risk that they shift to employees.  
Here is an opportunity to put the defined contribution revolution to use 
by moving more middle and high-income workers into the exchanges, 
improving choice for all on the exchanges and reducing the stigma of 
insurance purchased outside of the employment relationship.  ESI and 
the exchanges can and will continue to coexist—but when our 
attachment to ESI gets in the way of innovation in health insurance, it is 
time to look again at whether our bounded rationality is healthy. 
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